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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
EMERGING FTA APPROACH IN EAST ASIA AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
FOR VIETNAM 
 
By 
 
 BUI Truong Giang 
 
 
Regionalism and bilateralism have increasingly become major trends in global pattern 
of economic integration nowadays. Since the late 1990s, we have witnessed a new 
wave of regionalism and robust emerging bilateral FTA approach in trade 
liberalization and economic integration in East Asia. After reviewing theoretical 
issues on preferential approach to trade liberalization, the thesis describes and 
evaluates the emerging trend of policy shift to bilateral trading arrangements by major 
East Asian countries since the late 1990s. It also analyzes the international economic 
integration process of Vietnam from the perspective of FTA with the aim to draw out 
policy implications for Vietnam’s approaches to international economic integration in 
the post-WTO accession period. Vietnam targets to accede to the World Trade 
Organization in 2005. To prepare for the post-WTO accession period, Vietnam should 
soon be prepared for a balanced multi-track approach to economic integration and 
trade liberalization. Vietnam should take serious considerations on the options of 
bilateral FTA approach to deepen domestic reforms and offset the potential 
disadvantages as becoming “the outsider” of or excluded from a web of bilateral 
FTAs among the regional countries, among other negative effects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Together with multilateralism in the global trading system institutionalized by the 
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, regionalism and 
bilateralism have increasingly become major trends in global pattern of economic 
integration. The European countries are the fore-runners in these trends with the 
establishment of quite a few free trade agreements (FTA) among themselves since the 
1950s. The United States and East Asian countries, however, had been faithful to the 
multilateral approach until late 1980s. During the 1990s, North America and East 
Asia have witnessed the emerging trend of proliferation of regional and bilateral 
trading agreements. According to Robert Scollay and John Gilbert (2001), the central 
driver of the new trend in the Asia Pacific is the pursuit of regional trading initiatives 
by countries that had traditionally relied solely on the multilateral trading system. The 
first to shift was the United States with its bilateral agreement with Canada in late 
1980s. Japan and Korea, the two among a few that were consistently adhered to 
multilateral approach until recently, have also followed a similar policy shift with a 
dozen of bilateral initiatives with Southeast Asian and Latin American countries. 
China recently follows suite with FTA negotiations with ASEAN.  
Such policy shifts of major economies in the Asia-Pacific such as the U.S., 
Canada, Japan, China and Korea have challenged the multilateralism-based world 
trading system and the rest in the region for policy adjustment and paradigm change. 
The purpose of this thesis is three-fold: First, to review theoretical framework and 
issues on preferential approach to trade liberalization and integration. Second, to 
describe and evaluate the emerging trend of policy shift to bilateral trading 
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arrangements by major East Asian countries, namely Japan, China and Korea, and 
ASEAN since the late 1990s. Finally, to draw out policy implications for Vietnam’s 
approaches to international economic integration in the coming years. The key policy 
recommendation is that to prepare for the post-WTO accession period, Vietnam 
should soon be prepared for a balanced multi-track approach to economic integration 
and trade liberalization. Vietnam should take serious consideration on the options of 
bilateral FTA approach to deepen domestic reforms and offset the potential 
disadvantages as becoming “the outsider” of or excluded from a web of bilateral 
FTAs among the regional countries, among other negative effects. 
             
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF PREFERENTIAL TRADING 
ARRANGEMENTS (PTAs): 
Increase in world trade has accompanied with increasing number of preferential 
trade arrangements (PTAs). As more countries joins WTO, the same countries have 
simultaneously and actively established closer trading and economic ties with their 
neighbors and strategic partners. According to data on WTO’s RTAs notifications and 
IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics, in 2000, about 97 percent of total global trade 
involves countries that are membered of at least one preferential trading arrangement 
(PTA), compared with 72 percent in 1990. 
I.1. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF PTAs: 
Preferential trade arrangements (PTAs) are part of free trade approaches, which 
provide preferential treatment in trade among member countries. According to 
Panagariya (2000), preferential trade arrangements (PTAs) are agreements between 
two or more countries in which tariffs imposed on goods produced in the members 
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countries are lower than goods produced outside1. 
Preferential Trading Arrangements, termed by J. Bhagwati, refer to different 
levels of regional and bilateral economic integration (see Box I.1), whereas regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) is the collective terms used by the WTO to refer to the four 
following types of regional preferential trading arrangements: 
1. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs): under which member countries agree to 
eliminate tariffs and non-tariffs on trade in goods2 within the FTA, but each 
country maintains its own trade policies, including tariffs on trade outside the 
region. 
2. Customs Unions: in which member countries conduct free trade among 
themselves and establish common tariffs and other trade policy for countries 
outside the group. 
3. Common Markets: in which member countries go beyond customs unions by 
eliminating barriers to labor and capital flows across national borders within 
the market. 
4. Economic Unions: in which member countries merge their economies further 
by adopting common macroeconomic policies, establishing a common 
currency along with other common economic institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  
1  Panagariya (2000): “Preferential Trade Liberalization: The Traditional Theory and New 
Development”, Journal of Economic Literature 37 (2): 123-345. 
2 The current wave of FTAs is not just trade in goods, those agreements also lower barriers to services 
trade and investment flows, which is to be discussed further in later parts. 
Box I.1: Terminology of Preferential Trade Agreements. 
 
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are agreements between two or more countries 
in which tariffs imposed on goods produced in the members countries are lower than 
goods produced outside... 
PTAs also refer to preferential trading arrangements or areas... 
PTAs broadly defined include a host of trade agreements made outside of the 
multilateral trading system, including PTAs notified to the WTO as well as looser 
arrangements such as APEC... 
PTAs include regional trading arrangements (RTAs), which are PTAs where 
countries come from the same geographic region... 
In terms of their level f trade and economic integratio , there ar  several typ s of 
PTAs. The most modest form of PTA involves preferential tariffs-but not eliminating 
tariffs-between two or more countries on certain goods... 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are PTAs in which tariffs are eliminated entirely 
on the goods produced in member countries, but member countries maintain their 
own tariff structure with non-members.  
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Besides the key four types of reciprocal PTAs mentioned above, there are trade 
arrangements under which one party agrees to extend non-reciprocal preferential 
treatments to imports of a country or group of countries unilaterally. Such 
arrangements primarily involve developed countries extending non-reciprocal 
preferential treatments to imports from developing countries, for example the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), or 
the African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) employed by the United States. 
I.2. MOTIVATIONS FOR PTAs: 
Regional integration in general and preferential trade arrangements (PTAs) in 
particular is not only motivated solely by traditional trade gains and economic effects, 
but also increasingly by political rationales. Nations consider both economic and non-
economic factors when selecting FTA partner(s). According to a comprehensive study 
by the WTO (1999), political effects such as security, bargaining power, lock-in 
reform and lobby pressure are key calculation for nowadays bilateral and regional 
FTA approach, whereas economic effects such as competition and scale effects, and 
trade and location effects are also key motivations. 
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According to Urata (2002), countries should consider both external factors 
(secure market, provide export opportunities for domestic companies by dismantling 
trade barriers between nations) as well as internal factors (economic growth from 
increased efficiency due to greater competition as a result of the markets being 
opened; FTAs as external pressure for domestic regulatory reforms) when shifting to 
FTA approach. 
From a more comprehensive analytical framework, Mari Pangestu and Robert 
Scollay (2001) argue that trade motivation predominant (market access, defensive 
motivation or domino effect, slow progress in multilateral trade negotiation, 
Impatience of some individual economies with existing regional cooperation and 
arrangements, lack of multi and regional capacity to deal with emerging new issues, 
slow progress of East Asia in regional integration compared with other regions.) the 
policy shift to bilateralism and regionalism.  
From the perspectives of smaller and developing countries, development 
motivations are key, as FTA approach would  provide smaller states with enhanced 
capacity to negotiate and experience opening up in stages, push forward and lock in 
unilateral or overall reforms, enhance competitiveness for FDI and market, shared 
growth. For some particular group of countries like the case of ASEAN, political and 
security motivation is an appropriate explanation. The new regional or cross-regional 
FTA approach would help building a sense of community with neighboring economies, 
easing domestic political pressures in developed countries on labor and environmental 
issues, or even democracy requirement.  
John Whalley (1998) helps answering the question why countries seek RTAs by 
excellent summing up the five key determinants for FTA approach as follows:  
(1) Traditional trade gains. 
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(2) Strengthening domestic policy reform (Mexico in NAFTA) 
(3) Guarantees of access (Canada in CUSTA) 
(4) Strategic linkage (EU, ASEAN) 
(5) Multilateral and regional interplay, collective bargaining (US, EU). 
I.3. WELFARE EFFECTS OF PTAs: 
I.3.1. The Possible Economic Gains Of PTAs: 
When economies come together to form a larger free trading regions or areas, 
they expect for possible economic gains. However, there is no guarantee that those 
economic gains can be achieved, as static gains can be distorted by domestic as well 
as international factors, for example the dominant type of competitive behavior prior 
to deeper economic integration (Ali M. El-Agraa, 1989). The possible economic gains 
from any PTAs at various levels can be attributed to: 
1- Enhanced efficiency in production made possible by increased specialization in 
accordance with the law of comparative advantage, due to the liberalized market 
of the participating nations; 
2- Increased production levels due to better exploitation of economies of scale made 
possible by the increased size of the market; 
3- Improved international bargaining positions, made possible by the larger size, 
leading to better terms of trade; 
4- Enforced changes in efficiency brought about by intensified competition between 
firms; 
5- Changes affecting both amount and quality of the factors of production due to 
technological advances; 
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6- Factor mobility across the borders of the member nations will materialize only if 
there is a net economic incentive for them, thus leading to higher national 
incomes; 
7- The coordination of monetary and fiscal policies may result in the cost reduction 
since the pooling of efforts may enable the achievement of economies of scales; 
and 
8- The unification of efforts to achieve better employment levels, lower inflation 
rates, balanced trade, higher rates of economic growth and better income 
distribution may make it cheaper to attain these targets. 
The first five possible economic gains are for PTAs at free trade 
areas/agreements (FTAs) and customs union (CU), where as the last three can only be 
achieved at higher level of integration or going beyond FTAs and CU. 
 I.3.2. The On-going Debate On Effects Of  PTAs:  
I.3.2.1. Positive Effects vs. Negative Effects: 
A recent study by ADB (2002) argues that PTAs can contribute to the improved 
welfare of members and nonmembers by (1) improving communication between 
regional neighbors and reducing the chances of conflicts; (2) pursuing reform in areas 
not addressed or difficult to address on broader multilateral arrangements; (3) 
providing commitment mechanisms to support or reinforce domestic policy reforms; 
(4) and areas for experimentation and learning in trade liberalization. On the other 
hand, undesirable issues of PTAs include (1) rules of origin that distort comparative 
advantage; and (2) overlapping jurisdictions and rules of the various PTAs.  
According to Findlay, Haflah & Pagestu (2003): the risks of FTAs are: “The 
consequences of FTA can therefore be considered in a various categories, including 
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the impacts of trade diversion, the effects of retaliation, and the costs of the spaghetti 
bowl effects. Consequences include both domestic and international political effects. 
Progress in the WTO can be impeded as a result of their application. Overall, the 
tactic of favoritism contradicts the strategy of cooperation.” 
a) Economies of scale from larger market size vs. Incentives for inefficient 
allocation of resources: 
The very first and obvious effect of any freer trade arrangements is larger 
market size so as to gain economies of scale. Expanded markets thanks to reciprocal 
tariff cuts and trade facilitation can help firms cutting transaction costs and increase 
outputs.  
However, critics of PTAs focus on the degree to which the trade enhanced by 
PTAs distorts trade patterns between members and nonmembers, and generate 
incentives for inefficient specification. An individual country gain most if it joins a 
PTA in which its comparative advantage relative to the other members is similar to its 
comparative advantage relative to the rest of the world; worst is when member of a 
PTA has a comparative advantage relative to other members that is different from its 
comparative relative to the rest of the world, in such case, PTAs could be 
impediments to the structural transformation of an economy from lower to higher 
value-added production (Waltz, 1997).  
Exclusion of non-member leads to their worsen terms of trade (Chang and 
Winters 1999). Going PTA way also generates a scarcity of negotiation resources at 
the national level and negotiation fatigue, particularly for developing and small 
economies. 
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b) Lock-in effects vs. Stronger domestic protectionist group: 
For many developing countries which need radical market and economic 
reforms, using “external pressure” to accelerate domestic reforms is usually utilized 
and gain encouraging achievements. Those supporting the PTA approach argue that 
going bilaterals and regionals is feasible and positive option for many developing 
countries, that will push forward and lock in unilateral reforms, enhance 
competitiveness for FDI and market.  
Negative effects on the political economy of further domestic reforms are also 
expected, as preferential treatments under FTAs will create new and stronger set of 
vested interests that are opposed to further reform, because it would remove their 
favored positions in domestic or offshore markets. Further, bilateral negotiations are 
not likely to mobilize sufficient political support to deal with the very difficult and 
sensitive issues. FTA negotiation process will create new tensions and direct conflicts 
as preferential offers are discriminative and proposals to extend similar benefits to 
other trading partners are always disputable. Finally, even deeper political linkages 
are established within the group, tensions outside it will occurs, signaling diminishing 
quality of relationship with non-members.  
c) Fostering competition and technology transfer vs. Non-competitive behaviors: 
According to Summer (1991) and Lawrence (1991), reducing trade barriers will 
foster competition and technology transfer, therefore, joining a PTA will create more 
trade with at lease some countries and thus contribute to development, and allow both 
members and nonmembers to obtain benefits of increasing openness. However, 
noncompetitive behaviors (leave out certain sectors; allow preferential market access 
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in the group; allows firms in member countries to gain first-mover advantage (Fruend 
2000). 
d) Good precedents for negotiation modalities and high-standard trade 
liberalization agreements vs. Bad presidents of sectoral exclusion: 
Regional Trade Agreements can set good precedents and develop negotiation 
modalities that can be adopted later in multilateral negotiations (Loyd, 2002). There a 
number of examples of this. The Canada-US FTA in particular developed concepts 
and modalities in the service trade areas that were important in the development of 
GATS (General Agreement on Trade and Services).  
Bad precedents also go hand in hand with good ones, as Jagdish Bhagwati said. 
One example is the exclusion of some agricultural products from the trade 
liberalization under the Japan-Singapore EPA; Another example is the US 
predilection for side agreements on environment and labor standards. The structure of 
FTAs always excludes (quite a few) politically sensitive sectors and will not naturally 
evolve to MFN-based liberalization: a spaghetti bowl structure. 
I.3.2.2.Issues For Developing Countries:  
a ) Factor endowment complementaries in North-South PTAs: 
So, what happens if a developing and an industrialized country enter into an 
FTA? According to the classical considerations of Viner, trade diversion effects vis-a-
vis third countries are likely to dominate due to the complementary production and 
trade structure that generally determines North-South trade. This appraisal was 
criticized by some authors (see for example Piazolo 2001, Collier and Gunning, 2000, 
and Venables 1999) who argued that developing countries would benefit from an FTA 
with an industrialized country due to their different factor endowment. As a result, the 
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FTA would enable them to import cheap, capital-intensive inputs and export labor-
intensive manufactures, thus, stimulating the division of labor. 
b) Bargaining power from South-South PTAs:  
Proponents of South-South PTAs argue that the real benefit of PTAs is that they 
could serve as a vehicle to band countries together so that they would be able to 
increase their bargaining power in WTO negotiations. For small countries there may 
be a distinct advantage. By combining with other countries, they are in a position to 
get noticed, and extract more useful concessions from more powerful players. North-
South PTAs area theoretically preferred than South-South ones, from comparative 
advantage perspectives. However, South-South trading agreements are also mutually 
beneficial, as negotiations among a small group of neighboring countries closely 
associated with each other can make it easier to reach the necessary understanding 
and compromise. Therefore, such approach provides a building bloc for wider 
liberalization under the multilateral framework.  
c) Possible dynamic effects: 
For developing countries, regional integration with industrialized countries 
offers another positive aspect, as it might help them to develop their industrial 
capacities due to protected access to a larger market and strong cooperation (Kreinin 
and Plummer 2002:30). Besides this, the increased competition could result in a more 
effective usage of resources and stimulate innovational effects. Next to these 
economic dynamics, regional trade agreements might also offer political dynamics, 
such as an advanced relevance in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations due to 
the bundling of interests. Furthermore, the contractual agreement with an 
industrialized country might increase the economic and political reputation of the 
respective developing country and help to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) 
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(Padoan 2001, Collier and Gunning 2000). So, from a theoretical point of view, either 
the dominance of positive or of negative effects is possible. Or, as formulated by de 
Melo et al. (1993:160): “The literature on RI [Regional Integration] is full of the 
“anything may happen” type of results”. 
d) Sequencing bargaining effect: 
 Seen from the new political economy aspect of American trade policy. Labor 
standard and environment are burning issues that should be considered or included in 
any new trade agreements by the U.S. For developing countries with limited resources, 
such North-South PTAs would set higher standards for trade liberalization in the 
South. This is called the Sequencing Bargaining Effect. Bhagwati (1994) argued that 
even though a multilateral bargain simultaneously with a group of non-hegemonic 
powers (the South) is profitable and hence possible, a hegemonic power (the North) 
will gain a greater payoff by bargaining sequentially with them, using bilateral and 
plurilateral PTA approaches, picking the countries that are most vulnerable and then 
moving on to the next on and so on (Bhagwati and Arvind, 1996). This is the ways 
how high-standard “trade and” issues, which have made multilateral track stalled, are 
locked into trade liberalization roadmaps of developing countries. 
e) Revenue transfer effect: 
PTAs’ effect on government revenue is important for developing countries, as 
the RIA acts as an inefficient way of transferring some of the country’s tariff revenue 
either to domestic consumers or to partner country producers. Firms benefit from 
preferential access to partner markets at the expense of consumers and government 
revenue. Transfers are important in North-South RTAs because developing countries 
risk losing from a RTA with the North. The reason is that developing countries 
typically have higher tariffs than industrial countries. Consequently, the industrial 
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member is likely to gain more from increased access to the partner’s market than the 
developing member. The latter can resolve this issue by unilaterally lowering its 
tariffs. 
Implications: 
Welfare effects of PTA liberalization tend to be positive. When evaluated in 
pure economic terms related to only changes in trade flows, PTAs are, however, 
welfare reducing in the world as a whole (de Melo, Panagariya, and Rodrik, 1992; 
Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996; Schiff, 1997). Negative effects can be incentives for 
inefficient allocation of resources; Non-competitive behaviors; multiple systems of 
rules with hubs and spokes and spaghetti bowl effects; creating a scarcity of 
negotiation resources at the national level and negotiation fatigue, bad precedents; 
unequal access to world market; undermining the MFN principle further; and 
retaliation. 
There are mixed empirical outcomes regarding PTAs’ effects on level of trade, 
government revenue, lock-in effects on reforms. PTAs’ effects on level of trade differ 
with multilateral liberalization as it can create trade diversion rather than trade 
creation, which is to be further discussed in the next part. Difference between intra-
PTA tariffs and external tariffs and rules of origin are most mentioned factors that 
generate incentives for trade diversion. PTAs effects on market side depend on size 
and structures of members’ economies, which might generate industry-level scale 
effects and FDI attractiveness.  
I.3.3. PTAs In The Multilateral Trading System:  
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I.3.3.1. Building Blocks vs. Stumbling Blocks: 
a) “Open regionalism” and “Deep integration” arguments: 
The proponents of regional integration coin out the concept of “open 
regionalism” and “deep integration”. F. Bergsten together with advocates of the 
current wave of PTAs defends it on the ground that it represents "open regionalism" 
in contrast to closed, import-substituting regionalism of 1950s and 1960s3. There are 
three key criteria for open regionalism: (i) open membership with positive 
encouragement to nonmembers to join, (ii) consistency with GATT Article XXIV, 
and (iii) freedom to member countries liberalize further unilaterally or with non-
members on a reciprocal basis. Thus, “open regionalism”-based PTAs are stepping-
stones to freer multilateral trading system. 
The “Deep Integration” hypothesis advocated by R. Lawrence (1997) argues 
that regional arrangements promote "deeper" integration 4 . They involve "deep" 
integration through coordination or harmonization of competition policies, product 
standards, regulatory regimes, investment codes, environmental policies, labor 
standards and so on. He argues that such deep integration may confer gains on 
member countries by lowering the costs of production and improving efficiency in 
general. Bilateral and regional commitments also force other members of the 
agreements to make more progress in trade liberalization and thereby promote deeper 
integration in the RTA. Rajan et al (2001, chapter 2) give this as one reason behind 
Singapore’s pursuit of bilaterals. They refer to the “convoy problem” whereby the 
pace of integration is held back by the “least willing member”.  
                  
3 According to U.S. President’s Council of Economic Advisors, "Open regionalism refers to plurilateral 
agreements that are nonexclusive and open … It requires first that plurilateral initiatives be fully 
consistent with Article XXIV of the GATT … Beyond that, it requires … not constrain members from 
pursuing additional liberalization …", CEA (1995). 
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However, multiple systems of rules, Spaghetti bowl structures, and hub-and-
spoke layouts would generate unequal access to world market and more importantly 
undermining the MFN principle. Trading agreements based on preferential treatments 
undermine the principle of non-discrimination of the multilateral trading system, 
resulting in welfare loss.  
b) Spaghetti bowl effect: 
The negative effects are also obvious as vast amounts of human, financial and 
political resources have gone into negotiating and concluding these agreements. The 
more resources are devoted to the negotiation of multiple PTAs, the less they are 
available for the multilateral trade process. Jagdish Bhagwati calls the web of multi 
PTAs, mostly overlapping free trade agreements, as the “Spaghetti-Bowl” effect5, 
saying that to avoid trade deflection, FTA agreements usually include the rules of 
origin for receiving the duty-free status. The roots of such Spaghetti bowl effect are 
exceptions in GATT/WTO framework such as GATT Article XXIV and the so-called 
Enabling Clause for preferentially treatments to developing countries, which have led 
to crisscrossing trade preferences for countries where products in major markets enjoy 
preferential access terms depending on where they are originated. 
The proliferation of crisscrossing FTAs leads to a replacement of the 
nondiscriminatory MFN tariff by a spaghetti bowl whereby tariffs vary according to 
the ostensible origin of the product. (WB, 2004), the challenge in pursuing regional 
integration arrangements will be to avoid the “spaghetti bowl” effect of different rules 
and regulations associated with different agreements, which can add unnecessary 
administrative costs to firms doing business across the region.  
                                                   
4  Lawrence, Robert (1997), Regionalism, Multilateralism and Deeper Integration, Brookings 
Institution, Washington. 
5 See Chapter 1 in Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne Krueger (1995): “The Dangerous Drift to Preferential 
Trade Agreements”, AEI Press, Washington. D.C. 
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c) Hub-and-spoke effect: 
Another negative factor is the “Hub-and-Spoke” effect when one country 
concludes PTAs with several other ones6. To counter the open regionalism and deep 
integration hypotheses, Wannacott (2000) points out that FTA is less beneficial than 
presumed if it is part of a hub-and-spoke system, a system in which a hub country has 
a separate FTA with each spoke with no liberalized trade between spokes. Hub-and-
spoke system generates less collective income for participants than corresponding 
FTA covering the same countries because: a) trade barriers remain within hub and 
spoke system but not FTA, b) more protective barriers create greater rent-seeking 
waste and c) there will be a whole additional set of inefficiencies if hub and spoke 
bilateral agreements are inconsistent. 
The hub country will benefit in preferences and investment since it is only 
location with duty free access to all participating countries. Spoke-to-spoke trade 
suffers not only because of foregone benefits from a full FTA but also is damaged 
from new discrimination each spoke faces in all other spoke markets in competition 
with hub. Spokes face discrimination also in the hub’s market if the hub negotiates 
more favorable bilateral agreements with new spokes.  
I.3.3.2. PTAs And Future Multilateral Trading System: 
According to Baldwin’s (1993) domino theory, PTA membership will gradually 
expand to cover all nations, therefore complementary to multilateral trading system. 
Fernandez & Portes (1998) argue that PTAs serve as a focal point for the often 
dispersed domestic beneficiaries of liberalization to coordinate and offer strong 
                  
6 A hub arises where one country (customs territory) is a member of two distinct RTAs. Since the 
development of the new regionalism, many countries are now hubs. In the Asia-Pacific area, 
Singapore, the US, Canada, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Australia, New Zealand and Russia are now hubs on 
the basis of RTAs already in force and others such as Japan and Thailand may join them soon. 
 26
political support for continued trade reform. By other extreme, PTAs would become 
impediments against future moving forward of the multilateral trading liberalization, 
as Krugman (1991) pointed out that PTAs would reduce rather than increase demands 
for liberalization because vested interest groups who benefits greatly from preferential 
tariffs would lobby for status quo or against any changes or further expansion of 
preferential treatments. Levy (1997) shows that bilateral trade negotiations may alter 
domestic interest groups payoffs and make them more likely to block further 
multilateral liberalization.  
According to Krishna (1998), preferential access to large markets can create 
excess profits for producers in member countries, thus PTAs create new interest group 
opposed to further multilateral liberalization. Andriamanajara (1999) also argues that 
a PTA shrinks the export sectors of the non-members, which in turn, leads to 
expansion of these members’ import-competing and lobbying sectors. Therefore 
nonmembers become more protectionists, then undermine efforts for multilateral 
liberalization. 
In recent study, Scollay & Gilbert (2001) point out possibility that PTAs will 
allow like-minded protectionist policy outlooks to acquire greater bargaining power in 
the multilateral framework. Pessimistically, Bhagwati (1993) and Krueger (1997) 
consider that PTAs will profligate and overlap such that countries become embedded 
in a “spaghetti bowl” of mutually inconsistent trade restrictions, undermining the 
multilateral approach to trade liberalization.  
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Implications: 
The multilateral trading system, based on the GATT/WTO framework, has 
played a key role in post World War II global economic growth. The GATT/WTO 
system is built on basic principles of MFN and NT, or non-discrimination. The 
GATT/WTO system is not, however, without flexibility in implementation. There 
exist exceptions that allow member countries to deviate from the above-mentioned 
non-discriminatory principles. Those are provisions in GATT/Art. XX, XXI, XXIV, 
the Enabling Clause, GATS/Art.V, XIV, the ATC, SPS, or government procurement 
and tariff quota, to name a few. Of which, the PTAs come into exist thanks to 
exceptions under GATT/ Art. XXIV (Territorial Application-Frontier Traffic-
Customs Unions-and Free trade Areas) and GATS/Art. V (Economic Integration). 
Legally speaking, the GATT/WTO framework bans discriminations among member 
countries, but allows a group of member countries move towards freer trade 
liberalization among themselves.  
Regional economic integration through PTAs is a dynamic global trend that is 
shaping the world economy today. Regional integration can contribute to social 
welfare by generating trade creation effect and by acting as a stepping-stone towards 
further liberalized multilateral trading system. In this sense, regional integration is a 
building bloc to multilateral trade liberalization process. On the other hand, regional 
integration can be a stumbling bloc to multilateral trade liberalization, as overlapping 
regional integration arrangements might cause negative effects such as trade diversion, 
“Spaghetti-Bowl” and “Hub-and-Spoke” effects.  
PTAs as institutional mechanism for broader cooperation: PTAs offer a 
potentially stronger forum for negotiation of deeper integration and wider policy 
reform. PTAs smaller size and easier coordination between members are considered 
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as an advantage in achieving deeper integration; standard, regulation, and financial 
structure harmonization (Laird 1999). PTAs enhance regional security: increased 
trade among nations reduces the chance of military conflicts (Polachek 1992, Irwin 
1993). PTAs with larger markets can be seen as a form of insurance in the case of a 
global trade war (Perroni and Whalley 2000). PTAs can commit policymakers to 
reforms and prevent them backtracking on reforms once they are implemented. 
Both WTO and PTAs have ability to create more credible trade policy, external 
commitment can support more efficient specialization, reduce resources wasted on 
rent-seeking, and limit delay in adjustment to competitive pressures. PTAs have a 
potential comparative advantage vis-a-vis multilateral arrangements as regulations can 
be written more tightly, creating opportunities for members to commit non-trade 
policy goals such as investment liberalization or political reform. 
PTAs as practice for multilateral negotiations: Learning together and pooling 
resources; PTAs more palatable domestically in political terms as they allows 
reserving sensitive economic sectors and choice on partners that will not create strong 
competitive pressure for restructuring; internationally, PTAs as forum for diplomatic 
relations and increased economic integration. 
Although welfare consequences of PTA liberalization tend to be positive, it is 
generally acknowledged that PTA liberalization does not compare favorably with 
multilateral liberalization if gains from trade alone are considered. However, PTAs as 
feasible second-best means of trade liberalization (ADB, 2002). 
PTAs as trade facilitation mechanisms, not substitute for broader (multilateral) 
trade liberalization, because (1) there are economic limitations on the extent of gains 
from trade that can be achieved from trade within regional PTAs (small members with 
similar resource bases, manufacturing capacities and economic structures); (2) the 
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institutional features of the region’s PTAs are not the most conducive to achieve gains 
from trade, trade within PTAs is generally not free (retain sectors for protection; 
similar forms of rules of origin may lead to manipulated and differently interpreted by 
national authorities); (3) aggregate economic size of some PTAs tends to be small, 
limiting market-size effects. 
PTAs can also focus on ways to boots joint security, reduce political tensions 
and improve conflict resolution. To cope with government revenue losses, the need to 
ensure that alternative tax systems are in place before removing sources of trade tax 
revenue. 
I.4. THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (FTAs): 
Free trade agreements or areas have two main distinguishable respects: First, 
FTA member countries still possess their freedom or sovereignty to determine their 
extra-FTA tariffs and general commercial policies, and because this freedom may 
result in differing tariff rates in the member countries, which creates rooms for 
importing from third countries via the FTA member nations with lower tariff rates. 
Second, they will most likely introduce some sort of rules of origin7 (ROO) to ensure 
that only those commodities which are entirely or largely produced with the FTA 
should be treated preferentially or exempt from customs duties. 
As FTA member countries differ in commercial policies and external tariffs 
against the rest of the world, this may lead to three key effects8: 
                  
7 Shibata (1967, pg.68) attempts to specifically incorporate the rules of origin as an integral part of the 
definition of a FTA: “a [FTA] is defined as in internal grouping of countries, each of which agrees to 
exempt from tariffs and quantitative restrictions which it generally imposes on imported products, 
that part of theses products which have originated or are produced in the territories of the other 
member of the group.” 
8 The effects can also occur in production and investment. Here for simplification, only trade aspect is 
discussed. 
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a) Trade creation effect: The creation of trade occurs when a member of an 
FTA replaces domestic production of a good with imports of the good from 
another member of the FTA, because the formation of the FTA has made it 
cheaper to import rather than domestically produce. 
b) Trade diversion effect: The diversion of trade occurs when a member of an 
FTA switches its import of a good from an efficient non-member to a less 
efficient member, because the removal of tariffs within the group and the 
continuation of tariffs on imports from non-members make it cheaper to do 
so. 
c) Trade deflection effect: The deflection of trade will occur if trade barriers 
of high-tariff member countries are circumvented through the importation of 
products originating outside the area from low-tariff member. (If no 
precautious measures were taken and tariff preferences exceeded the 
additional transportation costs, imports would enter the FTA via the country, 
which applies the lowest tariff on the commodity in question.) 
I.4.1. The Debate On Welfare Effects Of FTAs:  
The pioneer study of Jacob Viner's (1950) discussed the concepts of trade 
creation and trade diversion9. Viner notes that since Preferential Trade Arrangements 
(PTAs) liberalize trade preferentially, on one hand, they create new trade between 
union members while, on the other hand, they divert trade from low-cost outside 
suppliers to high-cost within-union suppliers. The former effect arises from a union 
partner undermining another union member's less efficient industry and is beneficial. 
The latter effect, harmful, arises from a union member displacing a more efficient 
                  
9 Jacob Viner (1950): “The Customs Union Issue”, CEIP, New York. 
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outside supplier by taking advantage of the tariff preference it enjoys in a partner 
country. Unions which are primarily trade creating are beneficial and those that are 
primarily trade diverting are harmful to member countries taken together and to the 
world as a whole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although Viner’s model experienced numerous criticisms, it is still used when 
explaining the static effects of regional trade integration. However, along side of the 
static effects of regional integration, there are also several dynamic effects that can 
occur. In contradiction to static effects, dynamic effects of regional integration 
regenerate. For instance this is the case when economies of scale are exploited that are 
occurring due to increased market size. Companies are able to expand their 
production and fully load their capacities. In addition to this, the increased 
competition of the FTA results in an efficient factor allocation and thereby, ceteris 
paribus, to price reductions. This again increases the demand for goods and results in 
Box I.2: When does trade diversion occur? 
First, trade diversion can occur only if the country has a tariff on imports from the re
st of the world, and that the cost of trade diversion cannot exceed the height of this extern
al tariff. 
Second, trade diversion arises only if partner country costs are out of line with costs 
and prices in the rest of the world, this will not be the case if the partner itself has low tra
de barriers. 
Third, non-natural trading partners face higher transportation costs, which may lead t
o trade diversion. in reality products from different countries are not perfect substitutes, a
nd trade faces transport costs and other barriers apart from tariffs. The presence of transp
ort costs means that countries that are close may have lower costs of supply than more dis
tant countries. 
Finally, note that a RIA between two small developing countries is likely to only gen
erate trade diversion and no trade creation. 
Source: World Bank: Trading blocs.
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growth effects. Further dynamic effects of regional integration are learning and 
technology effects, both, due to the close cooperation with other members of the FTA, 
and through investors from third countries. This is in turn stimulated by an increased 
market and increased economies of scale (Hoeller et al. 2000, Krugman 1991). 
As proponents for regional approach, Wonnacott and Lutz (1989), P. Krugman 
(1991) and L. Summers (1991) utilized the concept of “natural trading partners”, 
saying that when union members are “natural trading partners”, they already trade a 
lot with each other and are geographically proximate, forming a preferential trading 
arrangement with close countries may be less prone to costly trade diversion than 
forming one with more distant countries. The risk of trade diversion is minimal. J. 
Frankel (1996) follows by the idea that the presence of transport costs makes regional 
integration among proximate countries an attractive option.  
But, as offered by Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), the natural trading partner 
and transport cost hypotheses has no analytical basis10. First, it is confused between 
small scope for trade diversion and a large outcome of it. Second, higher trade 
volumes at the creation of a PTA can lead to greater, not smaller, losses to a member 
country that comes to the PTA from a higher initial set of tariffs, since that will 
redistribute tariff revenues away from it to the other members with lower initial tariffs. 
Third, the “natural” high volume of trade occurring initially before a PTA is formed 
with another may itself be the “artificial” result of earlier preferences (Jagdish 
Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya, 1996, the economics of PTAs). Recent empirical 
studies by Yeats (1996), and J. Frankel and S. Wei (1996) find out evidences on trade 
                  
10 J. Bhagwati & A. Panagariya (1996): "Preferential Trading Areas and Multilateralism: Strangers, 
Friends or Foes?" in J.  Bhagwati & A. Panagariya, eds., “The Economics of Preferential Trade 
Agreements”, AEI Press, Washington, D.C. 
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diversion in Mercosur and EC11. This argument has not been resolved, Schiff (1999) 
argues that neither view is correct. 
I.4.2. An Economic Analysis Of Welfare Effects Of A Bilateral FTA:  
I.4.2.1: Vinerian Bilateral FTA Model With Constant Costs: 
Figure 01: Trade Creation in Bilateral FTA Model  
                  
11 Alexander J. Yeats (1996): “Does Mercosur's Trade Performance Justify Concerns about the Effects 
of Regional Trade Arrangements? Yes!”, World Bank, mimeo; Shang J. Wei and J. Frankel (1996) 
"Open Regionalism in a World of Continental Trade Blocs", AEA meetings, Jan. 3-6, 1997. 
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In this FTA model, we have country A, country B and C is the rest of the world. 
Initially, non-discriminatory tariffs are applied, country A imports Mo from country B 
at price of PBt (with tariff) and country A’s tariff revenue is (1) + (2) (Figure 01). 
Trade creation: 
Now that country A and country B decide to form an A+B FTA. As the result, 
the price level of exports supplied by country B will be lower to PB from PBt, where as 
world price is still at PC: PBt  > PC >  PB 
Tariff Revenue Loss of A = (1) + (2) 
New equilibrium point shifts from E to Efta, then country A will increase 
imports from country to Mfta: Mfta > Mo. 
Total surplus of A = (1) + (2) + (3) + (4). 
And tariff revenue of country A now is zero. Net gain for country A after 
forming A+B FTA is (3) +(4) (see Figure 01: Trade Creation): 
Anetgain = [PBPBtEEfta] – [(1)+(2)] = (3) + (4). 
Trade diversion: 
Figure 02: Trade diversion 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
E 
PB 
PC 
Mo Mfta
Efta 
Quantity 
PBt 
Price 
ESB 
ESC 
Price 
 35
 
 
 
 
 
Assume that: 
1. Country A just import from either country B or C.  
2. World price (PC)is lower than import price from country B: PC<PB. 
3. With non-discriminatory tariffs, world price with tariff is lower than import 
price with tariff from country B: PCt < PBt. i.e. country B is less efficient than 
the rest of the world (C).  
If A+B FTA is established, Tariff Revenue Loss of country A is (1) + (2). 
Country A’s consumer surplus = (1) + (3). 
At pre-FTA equilibrium point E, country A import Mo from C due to lower 
price. After the establishment of A+B FTA, Equilibrium point shifts to Efta, as 
country A’s imports increase to Mfta. But such import amount (Mfta) is now supplied 
by country B, as importing price without tariff from country B (PB) is lower than 
world price with tariff (PCt). This means trade is diverted from C (a more efficient 
supplier) to country B (a less efficient supplier) when A+B FTA is established.  
 Anetgain = (3) –(2) 
The net gain for country A depends on whether (3) is larger or smaller than (2). 
Normally, (2) tends to be much bigger than (3). The resulting welfare lost occurs as 
loss tariff revenue is used to pay for higher cost of production, and terms of trade is 
worsen as import at higher price. 
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I.4.2.2. Bilateral FTA With Rising Cost From Partner Country: 
Figure 03: Welfare Net Gain From Two-country FTA Model With Rising Cost  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Note: 
(1) = [GVWH]; (2) = [VUW]; (3) = [VFU]; (4) = [FLU]; (5) = [FSNL]. 
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Box I.3: An example of welfare effect of trade diversion 
Suppose that a country can import a good from a potential partner country at $105 per 
unit, and from the rest of the world at $100, and that in both cases the country pays $10 in duty, 
making the prices paid by consumers $115 and $110 respectively. In this situation consumers 
obviously purchase from the rest of the world and pay $110. If the country joins a RIA with the 
partner, imports come in duty-free so the price consumers pay for imports from the partner 
country falls to $105, while imports from the rest of the world still cost consumers $110. 
Consumer choices are obvious: They switch to the partner country, buying the $105 good and 
saving $5. But the government now loses $10 per unit (the revenue it was getting on each unit of 
imports from the rest of the world), so the net effect for the country is a loss of $5-the RIA has 
reduced real income. Another way of putting it is that the country (not the consumers) used to 
pay $100 per imported unit, and now pays $105. This is the deleterious welfare effect of “trade 
diversion.” 
Source: World Bank: Trading Blocs, Pg. 40. 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
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In this FTA model with increasing cost in partner country, we have country A, 
country B and C is the rest of the world. Export supply curve of country B (ES tB ) is 
upward sloping. Export supply curve from C is flat due to constant cost assumption. 
Initially, importing price from B (PB ) is lower than the world price (PC), and non-
discriminatory tariffs are applied. 
Country A imports Q1 from country B and [Q3 – Q1] from C. Upto point V, for 
country A importing price from country B is better than that from C. 
1) When A+B FTA is established: 
Tariff Revenue of A is (1) + (2)+ (3) + (4) + (5). 
New equilibrium point is shifted from W to U, country A rises import to Q2 
from B and reduces imports by [Q3-Q2] from C. The import amount [Q2 – Q1] is 
suffering from trade diversion from C to B. 
For country A: Tariff revenue for A now is only [FSNL] from C and no tariff 
revenue from B, and gain from trade declines by [GFLH]. Country A loses from its 
own trade liberalization because, the A+B FTA diverts imports from more efficient C 
to less efficient supplier B. 
For country B: Gains from trade rises by [HUD] + [GFUH].  
⇒ Therefore, when the A+ B FTA is established, the net welfare loss is [FLU].                
[a] 
2) When A+C FTA is established: 
The importing price for A declines to Pc, imports from B do not change but 
from C increase by NR. New equilibrium point shifted from S to R for A+C FTA. 
For country A: Tariff revenue [GSNH] disappears, but gains from trade is 
consumer surplus as [KSG] + new consumer surplus as [GSNH] + new consumer 
surplus as [SRN] + tariff revenue from B as [HWYD].  
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For country B: unchanged gain from producer surplus is [HUD]. 
For C: due to perfectly elastic supply, C neither gains nor loses from trade 
before or after A+C FTA. 
⇒ Therefore, when A+C FTA is established, the world as a whole net benefit is by 
[SRN].    [b] 
From [a] and [b], we can conclude that FTAs generate redistributive effects 
between countries. The world net welfare depends on comparing two areas of triangle 
FLU and triangle SNR:  
• If triangle SNR is larger: FTA increases social welfare. 
• If triangle FLU is larger: FTA decreases social welfare. 
Shifts in new equilibrium point: 
1) A+B FTA: U shifted to W. 
2) A+C FTA: S shifted to R. 
Therefore, we just have to compare the length of RN vs. UL or comparing [Q4-
Q3] and [Q2-Q1] 
The FTA could make member countries worst off if the FTA diverts more trade 
than creates, and vice verse. When forming an FTA, we must consider which FTA is 
good for the country as a whole (net welfare gain) by looking at the whole impacts or 
entire economy and figure out what kinds of industrial restructuring would occur. In 
most cases, the structure of the FTA will determines the net welfare effects of such 
FTA.  
II.  NEW REGIONALISM AND EMERGING FTA APPROACH IN EAST 
ASIA: 
II.1. NEW REGIONALISM AND EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: 
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II.1.1. New Regionalism And East Asia: 
Regional economic integration has become a world-wide phenomenon. In the 
wake of uncertainty about the outcome of multilateral negotiations on trade 
liberalization, particularly the Uruguay Round, and policy shift towards regionalism 
in the U.S, the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) have rapidly increased 
since early 1990s and reached 250, reported to the WTO as of March 2002. New 
studies reveal that by the end of 2005, the number of RTAs could approach 30012. The 
spread of this economic regionalism varies by region (table II.1), with over 51% 
located in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. While the EU is particularly active 
in regionalism, East Asia is the least developed region in terms of regionalism 
(Cheong, 2002). The sole exception of regional trade agreement in East Asia is the 
ASEAN/AFTA, and until recently (2001), the Northeast Asian countries - China, 
Japan and Korea - have not participated in any regional trade agreements. 
Table II.1: Important Regional Trade Agreements in 1990s 
Region Name Acronym 
Europe European Union EU 
 European Free Trade Association EFTA 
North America North American Free Trade Area Agreement NAFTA 
Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
Latin American Integration Association LAIA 
 Andean Community ANCOM 
 Central American Common Market CACM 
 Southern Cone Common Market Mercosur 
 Caribbean Community CARICOM
Africa Arab Maghreb Union UMA 
 Economic Community of Central African ECCAS 
                  
12 www.wto.org and Majluf, Luis Abugattas (2004): “Swimming in the Spaghetti Bowl: Challenges for 
Developing Countries under the New Regionalism”, UNCTAD. 
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States 
 Central African Customs and Economic 
Union 
CACEU 
 Economic Community of Wets African States ECOWAS 
 West African Economic Community CEAO 
 Southern African Development Community SADC 
Asia ASEAN Free Trade Area Agreement AFTA 
 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation APEC 
 Bangkok Agreement - 
 Economic Cooperation Organization ECO 
 South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation 
SAARC 
Middle East Gulf Cooperation Council GCC 
Source: Spero & Hart (2003), pg. 256. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the process of dramatically increasing of RTAs, on the one hand, is 
deepening integration at the bilateral, sub-regional and regional level is actually 
facilitated by developments at the Multilateral Trading System (MTS), which set 
common trade and regulatory disciplines, then easily adapted to the regional processes. 
Many in this  new wave of RTAs also extend beyond tariff liberalization to include 
Box II.1: Summary of Trends of RTAs 
- The number of RTAs is growing fast. By the end of September 2001, 239 RTAs had 
been notified to GATT/WTO, of those 100 RTAs have been notified since the creation 
of the WTO in 1995. As of 31 January 2002, 162 agreements remained in force.  
- Most of the RTAs (90%) are free trade areas (FTAs). 
- RTAs comprising of two parties account for around 60% of the RTAs in force and half 
of those under negotiations. 
- Around 30% of RTAs in force or under negotiations (regional and cross regional) 
involve at least one party being an RTA itself reflecting a growing consolidation of 
established RTAs. 
- 220 regional trading arrangements (RTAs) have been notified to the WTO, with 38 
being notified in the 1990-94 period and 80 since the creation of the WTO in 1995. 
- The number of notified RTAs in force comes to 119 and was fewer than the total number 
notified, but is more than double the number in force in 1991. 
Source: www.wto.org  
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more intrusive obligations, especially on intellectual property rights, services, 
investment, etc. The process is further complicated by the fact that traditionally RTAs 
were concluded among bordering countries with comparable levels of development, 
while the new wave of regionalism involves diverse countries located in different time 
zones.13  
In East Asia, since the mid 1990s there has been such a rapid acceleration of 
regional linkages as to constitute a new phase in regional development (Nick Thomas, 
2001). Particularly, since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, a new regionalism has 
emerged in East Asia. A number of bilateral agreements have been concluded and are 
being negotiated or studied (Charles Harvie & Hyun Hon Lee, 2002). A key feature of 
this new phase is that the new regionalism in East Asia has been proceeding more 
rapidly on financial issues than on trade. 
In what ways is the new regionalism in East Asia different from the old phase? 
Bjorn Hettne (1999) points out that the old regionalism was the product of a bipolar 
cold war era, whereas the new regionalism emerged from the multi-polar world. As 
far as economic integration is concerned, old regionalism was inward-oriented, 
protectionist, the new is described as “open” and thus compatible with an 
interdependent world economy. Furthermore, new regionalism is more comprehensive 
and multidimensional oriented, which includes trade, capital and service, but also 
environment, social policy, security and democracy. 
According to Hettne, the “old regionalism only concerned relations between 
formally sovereign states, the new forms part of a global structural transformation in 
which non-state actors are active and manifest themselves at several levels of the 
global system.” In this sense, East Asian new regionalism is part of the overall 
                  
13  Luis Abugattas Majluf (2004): "Swimming in the Spaghetti Bowl: Challenges for Developing 
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process of regionalization and globalization. The old regionalism aims to prevent the 
occurrence of another war in Europe, motivated by feelings of insecurity, whereas 
new regionalism in East Asia aims to pull their economic resources together to 
overcome their economic weaknesses in response to the extra-regional challenges.  
According to Lloyd (2001), the emerging regional integration in East Asia has the 
following key features:  
- They include a number of countries that were not previously members of any free 
trade area or customs union (Japan, Korea and China). 
- Several countries are now members of more than one RTA. 
- Several of the new agreements are “cross-regionals”. 
- Many of the new agreements are bilaterals. 
East Asia has achieved a high degree of market-driven regional integration, but 
regionalism-more formal economic cooperation and economic integration 
arrangements and agreements between countries—has traditionally been quite limited. 
The major exceptions have been the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), established in 
1993, and dialogue under Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). According to 
Yeats & Nguyen (2003), recent trends in the magnitude and composition of intra-East 
Asian trade bode well for further integration. Comparisons show that conditions 
within East Asia are now very similar to those in countries that were previously able 
to implement such successful regional arrangements as the European Union and 
NAFTA.  
                                                   
Countries under the New Regionalism", UNCTAD, 2004. 
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Figure II.1: Recent Trend in East Asian Economic Integration 
 
Source: WB (2004), pg.4 
II.1.2. Recent Developments In East Asian Regionalism: 
Lacking of regional cooperation institutions, ASEAN is considered as an 
important foundation for further regional integration in East Asia. Within the context 
of the Cold War, the East Asian economic integration process in general and that of 
ASEAN in particular were slow mainly due to political factors (Yip, 2001). The 
ASEAN preferential trading arrangements in 1977 was the first-ever regional trade 
agreement concluded in East Asia. Until 1992, the ASEAN/AFTA, became the first 
free trade agreement (FTA) signed in East Asia. During the 1990s, with the end of the 
Cold War and the accelerated wave of economic globalization, the regional economic 
integration process in East Asia gathered pace. The ASEAN-6 has become ASEAN-
10 and since 1997 the ASEAN Summit has accompanied by the ASEAN+3 
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framework, with the participation of leaders from ASEAN-10 and China, Japan and 
Korea. The ASEAN+3 is evolving into East Asian Summit, advocated at the 4th 
ASEAN+3 Summit in Singapore in 2000.  
The 1997 Asian financial crisis has damaged the ASEAN image, but it is also an 
important factor that led the East Asian countries to realize the need to strengthen 
economic cooperation. The ASEAN+3 framework was established in 1997 when the 
Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir unofficially invited the leaders of China, Japan 
and Korea to ASEAN 30th anniversary. Since then, the evolution of ASEAN+3 
framework has become a vivid evidence of the identifiable trend towards an East 
Asian economic community14.   
Since China’s proposal to promote an FTA with ASEAN during the Singapore 
ASEAN+3 summit in November 2000, regional trade integration has achieved 
remarkable developments. At bilateral level, as the AFTA became a reality on January 
1st 2002, significant developments recently include the China-ASEAN agreement in 
November 2001 to create an FTA (ACFTA) within 10 years and the conclusion of 
Japan-Singapore FTA (JSEPA) in January 2002. These additional economic and trade 
agreements help catalyze broader integration efforts by creating bilateral building 
blocs within a multilateral environment. Such blocs can be implemented in a shorter 
time period than region-wide agreements (Nick Thomas, 2002). 
On the financial side, the Chiang Mai Initiative launched in May 2000 has 
become the cornerstone for enhancing regional financial integration by increasing 
regional liquidity capacity through expanding the existing ASEAN swap arrangement 
                  
14 The 2nd ASEAN+3 Summit (1998) in Hanoi marked the ASEAN Vision 2020 and the establishment 
of the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) to help chart the future of East Asian economic integration. 
At the 4th ASEAN+3 Summit (2000) in Singapore, the inter-governmental East Asian Study Group 
(EASG) formalized the EAVG and idea about annual East Asia Summit was discussed. The 6th 
ASEAN+3 Summit recently held in Phnom Penh in November 2002 is considered a significant step 
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network to include all ASEAN members and bilateral swap arrangements among 
ASEAN countries, China, Korea and Japan. In addition, a regional surveillance 
mechanism has been established since 1999, which was envisaged to examine the 
regulatory and supervisory functions in the financial sector, corporate governance and 
external indebtedness issues in order to prevent the recurrence of a crisis. Observing 
recent regional economic cooperation, it is clearly indicated that East Asia is more 
active in financial cooperation than in trade cooperation.    
II.1.3. Determinants And Impediments To East Asian Regional Integration: 
From global perspectives, such trends as technology revolutions (transportation, 
information and communication) and economic globalization with growing 
interdependence are irrevocably shaping the world economy, posing new challenges 
as well as opportunities for East Asian economic integration. Within such context, 
East Asian is in urgent needs of institutional frameworks for regional wider 
cooperation and deeper integration. The ASEAN leaders have recognized institutional 
capacity shortfall of the organization while their counterparts in China, Korea and 
Japan have experienced such failure of the multilateral fora, more importantly, the 
competitive pressure from the increasingly economic integration in Europe and North 
America.   
According to Fred Bergsten (2000), four basic reasons for deeper integration in 
East Asian region are: The East Asian financial crisis, the most significant catalyst for 
new wave of East Asian regional integration; The failure of the WTO and of APEC to 
make headway on trade liberalization, a growing number of Asian countries turns to 
sub-regional trade arrangements for liberalization; The positive inspiration provided 
                                                   
to realize the East Asian Vision as the ASEAN + 3 process has matured and expanded to include 
regional political and security issues. 
 46
by European integration experience; and a broad disquiet with the behavior of both 
the United States and the European Union. Lloyd (2001), Yip (2002) and Young 
(2003) shares those points and explain further the new surge of bilateral FTAs by 
mentioning the domino effect of proliferation elsewhere, associated with fear of the 
loss of export markets and foreign investment, accentuated by the 1997-98 economic 
crisis and the desire to gain international political influence. 
With East Asian nations, this is also a visionary response to the challenges of 
globalization of international free-market forces. The idea of moving towards closer 
East Asian economic integration can be interpreted partly as a response to the 
evolving global trading system towards three major regions, namely NAFTA, EU and 
East Asia. An East Asian economic community will place East Asian countries in a 
better position to compete more efficiently in the international markets. This 
motivation is quite relevant with the new regionalism rationales.  
Beyond economic sense, new efforts for deeper East Asian economic 
integration is necessary for the region to deal with common regional problems, which 
are beyond the control of individual states such as regional drug trafficking, 
environmental pollution, illegal human migration and nuclear proliferation.  
However, there is a big gap between vision and reality. The above-mentioned 
developments are encouraging but the East Asian economic integration is only the 
beginning of a long march. According to Lee (2001), building a “politically 
sustainable” East Asian community is of great significance, as quite a few obvious 
obstacles need to be handled. The structural obstacles involve political, economic and 
cultural heterogeneities among East Asian countries such as (1) Political and 
economic rivalry between Japan and China or among NIEs; (2) The dependence of 
regional nations on United States in terms of market, investment and security 
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protection; (3) The differences in economic and political systems regarding 
democracy vs. authoritarianism and North-South relations within East Asian region; 
and (4) Cultural and social heterogeneity in consumer behavior, business practices 
and management methods.  
The institutional obstacles are (1) Effectiveness and legalization of regional 
institutions, (2) Redefining traditional concepts of state in the new context and (3) 
Institutionalization of regional cooperation are the key components. According to Lee 
(2001), lacking of institutions, handicapped with no clear goals and visions and 
effective functioning of existing institutions are obvious institutional shortcomings. 
The new global and regional context requires redefinition of the traditional concept of 
the nation-state and reposition of its role once regional institutions become socio-
political cement that mitigates self-interest and opportunism. However, the biggest 
challenge of East Asian economic cooperation lies in the lacking of a strong and 
centralized institution that possesses appropriate mandate and legal capacity (Lee, 
2001). The experience of ASEAN/AFTA and APEC as regional cooperative 
institutions has proven the need for a supra-national authority if an East Asian 
economic community is to be realized.  
In conclusion, wider and deeper economic integration in East Asia has become 
an identifiable trend. Recent developments such as the ASEAN+3 framework, the 
Chiang Mai Initiative, and emerging and robust bilateral FTA approach such as the 
Japan-Singapore FTA and the China-ASEAN FTA are concrete examples of a new 
wave of regionalism in East Asia. The global trends such as the technology revolution 
and economic globalization will accelerate regional integration in East Asia but its 
structural and institutional problems will hinder the process. The regional economic 
integration process has not only been slowed down by institutional obstacles, but also 
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hindered by structural obstacles involving political, economic and cultural 
heterogeneities among East Asian countries.  
Towards this end, the East Asian leaders should start with regional trade 
integration. Three policy options should be considered: A bilateral approach which 
results in a web of bilateral FTAs; a sub-regional approach which connects a 
Northeast Asian FTA with the existing ASEAN/AFTA; and finally a region-wide 
approach which envisions a single East Asian FTA. Considering recent developments, 
driving forces and impediments, the first approach is underway and become the 
economically second-best policy option, making the third one a far future.  
II.2. EMERGING FTA APPROACH WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF EAST ASIAN 
NEW REGIONALISM: 
II.2.1. Recent Developments And Key Features Of FTAs In East Asia:  
Since the start of 1990s, moves towards economic integration have progressed 
rapidly around the world, in which the form of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has 
played a central role. Most of concluded or proposed PTAs are in form of FTAs, 
rather than custom union. In the mean time, many countries, including major trading 
powers, are actively negotiating free trade agreements15. The number of free trade 
agreements in the world surged from 26 by the end of 1989 to 143 by the end of June 
2002. In East Asia, only 4 such agreements had been concluded as of December 2002 
(JETRO, 2003). The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) marked the very first FTA 
within Asia in 1993. Until recently, Korea, Japan, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan did 
not have any bilateral FTA with any economies. 
                  
15 See PECC (2002): “RTA Developments in the Asia-Pacific Region: State of Play”.   
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Since 1999, bilateral FTA initiatives are rapidly emerging and proliferated in 
East Asia.   At the end of 1998, South Korea proposed to Japan that the two countries 
study the possibility of a bilateral FTA. In September 1999, Singapore agreed with 
New Zealand to start FTA negotiations and with a number of countries like Chile, 
Mexico, Korea, and Japan. It was only in 1999 and 2000 that government-level 
negotiations and studies began to gather momentum. The pace of FTA developments 
accelerated in 2002 with crucial moves by China and Japan.  
For Japan: According to Urata (2003), Japan started discussing possible FTAs 
with several countries including Singapore, Korea, Mexico, Chile, Thailand, Malaysia 
and others in the late 1990s. After conducting a joint-study on possible FTA with 
Singapore, Japan and Singapore began negotiations in 2001. Japan entered into its 
first bilateral FTA, the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement in January 
2002. Recently Japan has concluded negotiations with Mexico and the two 
governments signed the bilateral FTA in February 2004. Japan is also conducting 
FTA negotiations with Korea, and plans for FTAs talks with Chile and ASEAN16 (i.e. 
Thailand and Malaysia) in early 2004.  
For Korea: the Roh Government has proposed A FTA roadmap, accordingly 
FTA targeted countries are: Korea concluded FTA with Chile in 2002, which was 
ratified by Korean National Assembly in early 2004. Korea is under negotiations 
FTAs with Japan and Singapore, and actively preparing for joint studies with Mexico 
and Thailand. Next will be negotiations with ASEAN, Mexico and EFTA. On the 
other hand, when favorable conditions are set domestically and externally, FTAs with 
large economies such as the U.S., EU, and China, or Korea-Japan-China FTA, East 
                  
16  Notably, Japan has signed with Vietnam an Investment Agreement to secure FDI activities of 
Japanese companies in Vietnam since November 2003. 
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Asia FTA will be underway. In mid-to-long term plans, FTAs with Israel, Peru, 
Panama, New Zealand, Australia, Canada and India will be proposed17. 
China has also suddenly shifted to regional preferentialism with China-ASEAN 
FTA signed in November 2002. though just a new WTO member, China has 
concluded FTA with Thailand and initiated FTA with ASEAN by 2010. China also 
spend reasonable resources for discussions and studies for a deeper and stronger 
economic ties with such Northeast Asians as Japan and Korea, a signal towards 
possible FTA(s) with those two neighbors. In global scale, China is considering a 
closer economic ties with EU.  
In the long term, China will step-by-step establish an East Asian FTA by first 
formulating FTAs with Northeast Asian economies such as Hong Kong, Korea and 
Japan, then merging with the ASEAN-China FTA. Then, China will also engage in 
linking South Asian nations into the would-be East Asian FTA. Finally, China will 
push for an Asia-Pacific FTA.  
For ASEAN, at the fifth ASEAN+3 Summit in Brunei in November 2001, 
leaders endorsed the EAVG Report, including the development towards an East Asian 
Economic Community (EAEC), among other mean through the creation of a broad 
East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA). The fifth ASEAN+3 Summit and the EAVG 
Report were overshadowed by China’s surprising proposal for an ASEAN-China Free 
Trade Agreement. One year later, at the sixth ASEAN +3 Summit in Phnom Penh in 
November 2002, China and ASEAN signed the Framework Agreement on ASEAN-
China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, which provided the foundation for 
negotiating an ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA). Simultaneously, the 
                  
17 See Kim Won-Ho (2003): “Korea’s Regionalist Approach: FTA & NEA Hub Policy”, KIEP, Korea. 
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leaders of ASEAN and Japan also introduced the Joint Declaration on the 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership between ASEAN and Japan. 
In September 2002, a Joint Declaration on Closer Economic Partnership has 
been signed between ASEAN and the CER countries, Australia and New Zealand. In 
late October 2002, at the occasion of APEC meeting in Mexico, President Bush also 
proposed the “Enterprise for ASEAN Initiatives” that will provide a bilateral Trade, 
Investment and Facilitation Agreement (TIFA) framework for the US to negotiate 
both bilateral and regional FTAs with Southeast Asian countries. At the first ASEAN-
India Summit in November 2002, India too has offer to start FTA talks and to have 
free trade agreement with ASEAN within 10 years. Australia has also offer ASEAN 
with a possible ASEAN-Australia Summit. ASEAN’s strategy appears to evolve itself 
as the “hub” of competing FTAs.   
For individual ASEAN member, Singapore and Thailand are the most active 
FTA dealers. To take first-mover advantage, after starting FTA negotiation with New 
Zealand in September 1999, Singapore also proposed FTAs with Chile, Mexico and 
Korea. In October of the same year, Singapore proposed an agreement linking AFTA 
with ANZCERTA. In November, it started FTA talks with Chile, and in December it 
proposed an agreement with Japan. So far, Singapore has actively proposed and 
concluded bilateral FTAs with New Zealand, Japan, Australia, EFTA and US, and 
been under negotiations or studies with EFTA, Mexico, Canada, Korea, India and 
EU18.  
                  
18  For detailed analyses of Singapore’s concluded FTAs so far, please see Low Linda (2002): 
“Singapore's Bilateral Free Trade Agreements: Institutional and Architectural Issues”, PECC Trade 
Policy Forum, Joint Meeting with PECC and Inter-American Development Bank, 23 April 2002, 
Washington DC. 
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Thailand is now conducting FTA studies and negotiations with fourteen trading 
partners, notably Australia, India, Korea, Japan, and the U.S. The Thai Government is 
deploying FTA strategy actively, taking the view that bilateral agreements can set the 
stage for multilateral arrangements. Malaysia is catching up with primary negotiations 
with Japan and the U.S. On the contrary, Indonesia has shown no moves  towards 
bilateral FTAs, as it first has to address the task of domestic economic reform. The 
Philippines is interested in developing export markets by concluding FTAs with 
developed economies as well as participating in ACFTA, and is studying the 
possibility of FTAs with Japan and United States (JETRO, 2003). 
A race to be hubs: As proven by hub-and spoke argument, the most beneficiaries 
would be the hubs in the FTA game, therefore, all FTA players try to be the hubs. 
Such “hub-driven strategy” is most obvious in the case of ASEAN. ASEAN is making 
efforts to realize AFTA schemes and becoming anchor for a region-wide East Asian 
FTA as well as a hub of FTAs with China, Japan, the U.S., CER (including Australia 
and New Zealand), India, and EU. For example, ASEAN-CER FTA, ASEAN-US FTA. 
ASEAN-China FTA; ASEAN-Japan FTA; ASEAN-Korea FTA; ASEAN-India FTA; 
and ASEAN-EU FTA, to name a few.  
Regional and cross-regional membership: East Asia, comprising of South East 
Asia and North East Asia, though slower in embracing regionalism (Urata, 2002), has 
willingly and actively shifted to regional trade arrangements (see table II.2). Besides 
Singapore, Thailand and other ASEAN members with the 1992 AFTA, the new 
players in FTAs game in East Asia are Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan.  
Table II.2: Definite Proposals on FTAs in the Asia-Pacific 
Proposals and signed FTAs Proposed members 
Bilaterals 
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Japan-Korea 
Japan-Singapore EPA (Summer 2002) 
Korea-Singapore 
Australia-Thailand 
Regionals 
Proposals and signed FTAs Proposed members 
ASEAN-China FTA (Nov. 2001) ASEAN-10, China 
ASEAN Japan FTA ASEAN-10, Japan 
ASEAN +3 FTA ASEAN-10, China, Japan, Korea 
North East Asian FTA China, Japan, Korea 
Pacific Island Countries Trade 
Agreement  
 Papua New Guinea, Pacific Islands 
P5 U.S, Australia, New Zealand, 
Singapore, Chile 
AFTA-CER ASEAN/AFTA-10, CER-2 (Australia 
and New Zealand) 
 
East Asian countries are not only establishing FTAs among themselves but also 
with the rest of the world. For example, Singapore has got trade arrangements with 
New Zealand (Singapore-New Zealand CEP 2001), or with U.S, Canada, Japan, 
Mexico and Australia. Japan, after its very first arrangement with Singapore (2002), 
has recently signed FTA with Mexico in March 10th 2004, or Korea has got her 
National Assembly’s approval for Korea-Chile FTA in February 2004. Currently, 
ASEAN as a whole, Thailand and Korea are actively negotiating FTAs with the 
United States. 
Free trade agreements are not just FTAs: The scope and coverage are much 
more comprehensive than the orthodox concept of free trade agreement: The current 
wave of FTAs is not just trade in goods, those agreements also lower barriers to 
services trade and investment flows, intrusive obligations for intellectual property 
rights etc. According to Urata (2002), FTAs include new players, FTAs are getting 
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larger and deeper, and FTAs are reaching farer, not necessarily in close geographical 
proximity.  
II.2.2. Key Determinants For Policy Shifts Towards FTA Approach:  
In East Asia, determinants on policy shift towards bilateralism and regionalism 
vary from country to country. The following part is a review of why major countries 
and economies in East Asia such as Japan, Republic of Korea, China, ASEAN and 
Singapore have actively shifted bilateral and regional FTA approach.  
In Japan, the WTO system is not enough to guarantee national interests: 
Traditionally, Japan has assigned the highest priority in its trade policy to multilateral 
cooperation through the GATT and WTO frameworks, in order to reduce tariffs and 
other trade barriers. However, the tide of regional economic integration, including 
various free trade agreements (FTA) throughout the world, was stronger in the 1990s. 
It has become more difficult for Japan to protect its interests in the field of 
international trade by means of the WTO system alone. 
Becoming APEC member in early 1990s, Japan had shifted from the one-track 
approach based on the GATT/WTO multilateral trading framework to two-track 
approach, comprising of global and regional approaches. The late 1990s saw a major 
shift in Japan trade policy from two-track approach to multi-track one, as it began to 
take FTAs formally and seriously. Motivations for policy shift include (1) the 
importance of trade liberalization to revitalize the Japanese economy; (2) FTAs 
provide firms with business opportunities in member countries, as FTAs remove trade 
barriers in their markets; (3) FTAs with East Asian countries promote economic 
growth and political stability in the region; and (4) Japan considers FTAs as good 
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precedents for rule making process within the GATT/WTO framework, particularly in 
the negotiations of “trade and” issues. 
According to Urata (2003), three key factors that make Japan actively shift to 
regionalism are (1) increasing importance of intra-regional trade in East Asia; (2) 
Increasing importance of East Asian trading partner for Japan; and (3) rapid 
expansion of regional trade agreements in recent years.  
For Republic of Korea, just like other North East Asian countries19, Korea is a 
late comer in the game of regionalism and bilateralism. Korea’s trade policy had 
shifted from Mercantilist expansion of trade in 1960-1970s to market opening and 
liberalization based on multilateral framework in the 1980s. In the context of 
globalization in 1990s, Korea has adopted a parallel approach of multilateralism and 
regionalism with the former as dominant trend. In the late 1990s, particularly after the 
1997 economic crisis, Korea has actively shifted to strengthening regional and 
bilateral economic cooperation by introducing FTA policy. 
Korea reconsiders multilateral approach to trade policy and shift to the adoption 
of FTA policy due to Changing perception on regionalism: The increasing 
importance of RTAs in the world trade; the recent proliferation of regional and 
bilateral trade arrangements and their successful performance has made Korea believe 
that RTAs could be a complementary force to multilateral trading approach in 
achieving world free trade system (Sohn, 2001). 
 Cheong (2001) and (2003) and Sohn (2001) explained key driving forces for 
Korea’s policy shift to FTA bilateral and regional approach: First, Korea is under 
increasing pressure from the changing international economic environment and FTAs 
are to diversify trade and investment relationships to adapt to emerging threat of new 
                  
19 Until recently, North East Asia was the only region of the world that had no RTAs. 
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protectionism in the multilateral trading system. Korea’s dependence on foreign trade 
require securing export markets; Second, the trend of regionalism is now dominant in 
world trading system, Korea’s trade policy must change to avoid To avoid isolation 
and exclusion from such RTAs; Third, FTAs would create lock-in effects to ensure 
continuity of domestic reforms. The 1997 financial crisis provides the lessons of 
maintaining economic reform and open policy to upgrade the national economic 
system to meet international standards and strengthen competitive edges; and finally, 
forming appropriate FTAs will enable Korea to create political allies, attract foreign 
capital, establish overseas footholds to secure stable foreign export market for Korean 
companies, overcome discriminatory practices under other FTAs, and increase 
consumer welfare.  
Increasing economic interdependence requires new means for protect and 
maximize national interest, FTA approach helps strengthening politico-economic ties. 
Joining or creating regional and sub-regional trading blocs is prevailing approach to 
accomplish such requirement, as economic cooperation is expected to spill over to 
political and diplomatic cooperation, covering a wide range of issues such as security, 
environment, labor and cultural exchanges. By forming FTA with major trading 
partners, Korea will strengthen its bargaining position and enhance its political 
influence and diplomatic weight in multilateral fora such as WTO, OECD, and IMF.  
For China, it has worked hard, domestically and internationally, for WTO 
accession process, which end in December 2001 with its official gaining WTO 
member status, then lagging behind in bilateral regional integration. The FTA 
approach by China is a strategic geo-economic move to response to US’s containment 
of a rising China; to counter-balance the Korea-Japan closer economic partnership; 
and to allay ASEAN‘s fears of a China "threat".  
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China’s strategic benefits are: The PRC would like to seize the opportunity to 
replace Japan as the primary driving force for economic growth and integration when 
Japan has been in economic recession for about a decade. Through the establishment 
of a China-ASEAN free trade area, the PRC will be able to weaken the US influence 
and have greater voice in regional matters. The PRC’s another political and strategic 
interest resulting from the creation of a China-ASEAN free trade zone is a 
marginalized role in regional economy the ROC will be compelled to assume. 
Angang Hu (2002) argued that the RTA has become one of the main features of 
economic globalization, China could not stand out of the trend. To set up FTA 
between North East Asian countries and ASEAN is a big step of the open strategy for 
China economic development. Why China focuses on establish regional FTA with 
NEA and SEA countries: First, the real degree of China’s economic opening is relative 
low (9.5% of GDP in 2000) and China’s long run goal of economic development is to 
set up an open economy. Furthermore, after joining WTO, China as well as other 
developing countries seeks economic growth with new system arrangements, FTA 
helps accelerate regional economic integration, participating in both international and 
regional markets. Finally, establishing FTA-based trading ties with NEA and SEA 
countries would help realizing the new domestic strategy of “going to the West”.  
For ASEAN as a group, besides political and security motivation which helps 
building a sense of community among neighbors, collective bargaining power with a 
common voice is the key determinant. The 1997 economic crisis and losing 
competitiveness vis-a-vis China require ASEAN’s efforts to deepen intra-ASEAN 
integration and expanding extra-ASEAN linkage. According to Kim (2002), ASEAN 
members want to overcome the economic weaknesses by linking up with the larger 
and more powerful economies and becoming the so-called “hub” in the FTA game.  
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For Singapore, as a highly trade-dependent economy, it cannot stand still for the 
painful Asian crisis, the slow ASEAN integration and stalled multilateral trading 
liberalization. Domestically, for maintaining international competitiveness, Singapore 
is trying to transform itself towards more private sector-led economy (Low, 2002). As 
a believer on multilateralism, Singapore used to put highest priority to the 
GATT/WTO multilateral trading framework, but the changing external as well as 
internal environment has made Singapore reconsidered its multilateral approach 
towards regional and bilateral approaches. RTAs are now complementary and 
supplementary to the multilateral process. FTAs are considered as an instrument to 
accelerate trade liberalization and strengthen the multilateral system. They provide 
better business environment with lower transaction cost due to lower tariffs for 
exports of goods, harmonized custom procedures, improved market access for various 
commercial and professional services, easier entry for businessmen into other 
countries, better terms for investment in foreign countries. Bilateral FTAs also lock in 
domestic reforms and import best policy practices from advanced economies. They 
set a framework for Singaporean small and medium businesses to grow and expand 
regionally and globally, which in turn will generate more employment and revenue.  
As summing up by Lloyd (2001), key determinants for East Asia’s emerging 
FTA approach include: 
- Gains from trade and factor flows and greater competition in markets20, 
                  
20  Some empirical calculations on economic effects of recent FTAs in East Asia have provide 
interesting findings: First, for Japan-ASEAN Closer Economic Partnership (JACEP), between base 
year of 1997 and 2020, the realization of the JACEP would augment exports by 27.5% in Japan to 
ASEAN and 44.2% in ASEAN to Japan, while it would boost gross domestic product by 1.99% in 
ASEAN and 0.07% in Japan. Second, for ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), if tariffs are 
reduced to zero by both sides, ACFTA would expand exports by USD13 bil. per year (48%) from 
ASEAN-6 to China and USD 10.6 bil. (55.1%) from China to ASEAN-6, while GDP would grow 
by o.86% in the ASEAN-6 and 0.27% in China. 
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- Binding of market access for goods and prevention of contingent protection 
actions by fellow members (anti-dumping, countervailing or safeguard actions), 
- Ease of negotiations with fewer parties, 
- Benefits of deep integration resulting from the cross-border harmonization of 
national economic policies and regulations, 
- Regional security, and 
- Fear of exclusion from major markets. 
II.3. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENTS:  
Besides non-economic motivations, key supporting arguments for FTA policy 
shift vs. WTO’s multilateral approach are: First, FTA is faster among smaller and 
like-minded group of countries; Second, possible FTAs face less anti-globalization 
pressure; Third, fewer members leads to easier rule making 21 ; and fourth, to 
strengthen political and economic influence and bargaining power in international 
arena, most important for small countries.   
There is a race to be the FTA hubs and develop as many spokes as possible 
among East Asian countries. As far as the trade policy is concerned, the true nature of 
regionalism in East Asia is bilateralism, specifically, a “competitive hub-&-spoke 
bilateralism” (Young, 2003). Korea, Japan, ASEAN, Singapore and China each want 
to become a major hub in the network of bilateral FTAs in East Asia. 
Such bilateralism in FTA approach would result in a serious “spaghetti bowl” 
effect, accompanied by significant distortions in trade, investment, and production in 
the region. Each East Asian economy has many politically “sensitive” sectors, and 
each FTA has been and will be designed to protect these sectors with many exclusions 
(box II.2) and its own complex rules of origin.                                                                                         
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It is also likely to serve more as a stumbling block than as a building block for 
the multilateral trading system. It will also be detrimental to the economic dynamism 
of East Asian region, as the spaghetti bowl effect will undermine the efficacy of such 
intra-regional interdependence 22. 
East Asia now accepts that bilateral and regional approaches to trade liberalizati
on and economic integration are complementary and supplementary to the stalled mul
tilateral one. The FTA approach will not only boost domestic reforms but also secure e
xternal markets and escape from isolation and exclusion by competing FTA game in o
ther regions. However, current FTA evolution in East Asia foretells a race to be the hu
bs with serious “spaghetti bowl” effect will serve as a stumbling block against the mul
tilateral as well as the East Asian region-wide trading systems. 
                                                   
21 In game theory, the larger number of players, the harder for decision-making.  
22  Young Soogil (2003): “Strategy for Coping with a Proliferation of RTAs and Encouraging 
Convergence toward Regional and Global Liberalization and Integration Objectives: an East Asian 
Perspective”, PECC Trade Forum Seminar, Washington, D .C., on April 22, 2003 
 
Box II.2: How bilateral FTAs in East Asia to deal with sensitive sectors 
Korea-Chile FTA: 
- The refrigerator and the washing machine are excluded. 
- Apple, pear and rice are excluded while grape is subject to seasonal tariffs. 
- Concession on more than 370 agricultural products have been withheld and will be 
discussed after the conclusion of the DDA round. 
Japan-Singapore FTA: 
- All agricultural products are excluded as a matter of principle. 
ASEAN FTA (AFTA): 
- The ASEAN-6 countries refuse to lower tariffs on their “sensitive” products (e.g., 
Indonesia’s textile and petrochemical, Philippines’ cement, and Malaysia’s 
automobile) to below 5%. 
- Non-tariff barriers remain numerous and serious. 
ASEAN-China FTA: 
- China will exclude rice and palm oil. 
- ASEAN countries each will request exclusion of many manufactured products. 
Source: Young (2003) 
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III. THE FTA APPROACH WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF VIETNAM’S 
INTERNATIONAl ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: 
Background: 
Vietnam officially launched its comprehensive economic reform program 
(known as Doi Moi or Renovation) in 1986. The overall mission is to transform 
Vietnam from a centrally planned economy into a socialist-oriented market economy. 
The two pillars are domestic reforms and international integration. For the first pillar 
of domestic reforms, Vietnam aims at (1) Introducing market mechanism into the 
agricultural sector and to the price, wage, and monetary systems; (2) Undertaking 
domestic trade liberalization by eliminate monopoly of State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in distributing goods and services, and expand trading rights to non-state 
economic sectors; (3) Reforming the SOE sector and diversification of ownership 
types in such transitional economy as Vietnam by developing multi-sectoral economy, 
resulting in a boom of the private sector and entrepreneurship; and (4) Reforming 
banking and financial system by restructuring the state-owned banking system into a 
two-tier system, developing new banking and financial institutions, and revamping the 
public finance system ..etc. 
For the second pillar of international integration, Vietnam started “open-door” 
policy in late 1980s within the context of American embargo by multilateralization 
and diversification of external relations and active integration into the world economy. 
Since late 1980s, Vietnam has been shifting towards an open market economy and 
integrating into the regional and international economies. Vietnam is now ready to 
become friends and partners to any country in the world.  
III.1. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF VIETNAM: 
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As a crucial pillar in comprehensive renovation of Vietnam, Vietnam has consistently 
conducted the policy of open-door and making friends and partnership with nations 
and economies in the globe. Regional and international economic integration is of 
highly importance, as it has brought Vietnam out of isolation during the post-Cold 
War period. Generally, the international economic integration process of Vietnam 
since Doi Moi is two-fold:  
The 1986-1995 period of unilateral integration and normalization of external 
economic relations, In this period, Vietnam had normalized relation with China in 
1991, with the international donors via Paris Club in 1992, with the United States in 
1994, and Vietnam strategically joined the ASEAN in 1995. 
The so called 1995-2005 period of active regional and multilateral economic 
integration and development of new bilateral economic ties. During the second half of 
1990s, Vietnam has made important binding and non-binding commitments in key 
regional fora such as becoming member of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 
1996, joining Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) in 1998. Vietnam 
has undertaken a crucial step by signing economic and trade cooperation framework 
with EU in 1995 and the Bilateral Trade Agreement (VN-US BTA) with the United 
States in 2000, and is now actively conducting a series of working group meetings 
and bilateral negotiations for the target of WTO accession by 2005. 
According to a rough review by Vietnam Ministry of Trade, Vietnam has 
concluded 86 bilateral economic and trade cooperation agreements/frameworks and 
signed almost 40 bilateral investment treaties with various partners so far, The 
following parts will introduce binding commitments by Vietnam in its key bilateral, 
regional and multilateral trading arrangements such as the ASEAN/AFTA and the 
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ASEAN-China FTA, the Vietnam-United States BTA, and tentative commitments for 
the WTO accession.  
III.2 THE CASES OF ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA (AFTA) AND ASEAN-CHINA 
FREE TRADE AREA (ACFTA): 
a) The Case Of ASEAN FTA:  
The 4th ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 1992 agreed to establish a free trade 
area and signed the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic 
Cooperation. ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) signed the Agreement on Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). The 
objectives of AFTA are to increase ASEAN competitive edge as a production base for 
global market. AFTA also helps enlarging the ASEAN market and provide the 
platform for technological transfer and development of new industries.  
The key commitments under CEPT/AFTA are eliminating tariffs on all products 
by 2010 for ASEAN-6 original members and by 2015 for ASEAN-4 new members. 
Accordingly, 60 per cent of all products would be at 0% tariff rates by 200323. The 
CEPT/AFTA has also committed to eliminated all quantitative restrictions and other 
non-trade barriers (NTBs). 
By 2003, the implementation of CEPT/AFTA has made impressive progresses. 
For ASEAN-6 original members, 98.8% of products are in Inclusion List (IL) of SEP
T scheme, 99.6% of products are at 0% to 5% tariff rates. CEPT scheme has covered a
ll products except those under General Exclusive List (GEL). With ASEAN-4 new me
                  
23  The CEPT scheme covers all manufactured products, processed and unprocessed agricultural 
products. Criteria for enjoying CEPT concession include (a) products wholly obtained or produced 
within ASEAN; (b) comply with the 40% local or ASEAN cumulative content rule; and (c) granted 
on the basis of reciprocity. The tariff cut schedule is categorized into four lists (Inclusion List (IL), 
Temporary Exclusion List (TEL), Sensitive List, and General Exclusion List). 
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mbers,72.2% of products have been in IL of CEPT scheme. 55.7% of products are at 
0% to 5% tariff rates. 
Table III.1: Status of Products at 0-5% Tariff for ASEAN Members in 2003. 
Country Products at 0-5% Import Duty (%) 
Brunei 99.18 
Indonesia 100.00 
Malaysia 99.26 
Philippines 98.81 
Singapore 100.00 
Thailand 99.92 
Cambodia 7.64 
Laos 53.57 
Myanmar 78.00 
Vietnam 65.44 
Source: Complied from ASEAN Secretariat. 
For Vietnam, the implementation of AFTA has significantly helped trade 
liberalization. As part of the broader strategy of international economic integration, 
Vietnam committed to implement a full package of goods for tariff cut under 
CEPT/AFTA upon entering ASEAN in 1995 (see box III.1). The tariff cut schedule is 
categorized into four lists on which Vietnam plans to lower its all tariffs in IL and 
TEL to a range of 0% to 5% by 2006.  
 
 
 
Vietnam has committed to the CEPT/AFTA acceleration plan in three steps: 
1. Vietnam must accelerate the transferring  of TEL to IL by 2002. 
2. Vietnam must reduce CEPT tariff rates to 0% to 5% by 2003. 
3. Vietnam must implement the reduction of CEPT tariff rates to 0% by 2006.  
Many economic sectors, particularly the SOEs, will be affected by the 
committed tariff reduction scheme. The unweighted average CEPT rate applicable to 
imports from ASEAN region is expected to decline from 10.7 percent in 2002 to 3 
Box III.1: Commitments under ASEAN Free Trade Area 
Tariffs on the vast majority of tariff lines (estimated 95 percent) on ASEAN imports 
will be reduced to at most 20 percent by the start of 2003, and to 0-5 percent by the 
beginning of 2006. 
Average tariffs on manufactures from ASEAN countries will be cut by 50 percent by 
early 2004. 
Average tariffs on ASEAN imports of textiles, leather, wood products, non-metallic 
mineral products (e.g. glass and ceramic products) and food products will fall by more than 
60 percent by early 2004. 
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percent by 2006. In addition, the sensitive list is expected to be phased out by 2010. 
Commitments under AFTA also imply that quantitative restrictions have to be 
abolished. Reduced protection will put pressure on the Government of Vietnam to 
increase fiscal transfer and credit to SOEs and prioritized programs, which would 
negatively effect other sectors in the economy. 
The significance of AFTA for Vietnam is that AFTA is the very first strategic 
commitment to economic reform and regional integration since the end of the Cold 
War. AFTA acts as a facilitator for export-oriented industrialization and 
modernization process, a momentum for improvement of efficiency of domestic 
production (economies of scale, management, technology, regional production 
linkage through FDI by TNCs), a move to gain MFN status from ASEAN countries, 
which promises a huge “trade creation” effect. 
b) The Case Of ASEAN-China FTA: 
Premier Zhu Rongji surprisingly proposed a free trade area (FTA) with the 
ASEAN nations when he attended an ASEAN Plus Three meeting in Singapore in 
November 2000. Barely a year later, the 10-nation grouping at the ASEAN summit in 
Brunei accepted China's proposal to create the world's largest FTA within 10 years: a 
market of 1.7 billion consumers and a GDP of $2 trillion with trade worth $1.23 
trillion.  
The ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA) will be created within ten year, or by 2010. 
As a sweetener, Beijing offered to unilaterally open its own market to the ASEAN 
countries five years before these economies were ready to reciprocate by the “Early 
Harvest Scheme”, which is further discussed below. Beginning on January 1, 2002, 
six old ASEAN member countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
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Singapore and Thailand) brought tariff rates of many Southeast Asian products down 
to 0-5%. The other four members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) will 
begin to do so in 2006. Then, the old ASEAN member states will eliminate all tariffs 
and remove quantitative restrictions and non-tariff barriers in 2010. The rest of 
ASEAN member states will achieve these goals in 2015. In fact, the ACFTA is the 
extension of ASEAN member states’ common effective preferential tariff (CEPT) 
Scheme to the PRC while the latter carries out tariff reduction programs and provides 
similar product lists consistent with the CEPT Scheme. 
 Regarding trade in goods, the key component of the ASEAN-China Framework 
Agreement is the Early Harvest Program (EHP). This program allows the reduction 
of tariffs on certain products before the onset of the FTA. The program would reduce 
tariffs on these products over 3 years: to 10% by 2004, to 5% by 2005 and zero tariffs 
on these products by 2006. Most of the products from Chapters 1-8 of the HS code 
(Harmonized System) were covered under the EHP24. The EHP is scheduled to start 
on 1st Jan 2004 and be fully implemented by January 2006. The goods negotiations 
are set for conclusion on 30th June 2004 and implementation of the tariff reductions 
for the non-EH goods are set to commence on 1st January 2005. 
Vietnam, as a new ASEAN member will have to fully implement ACFTA by 
2015. However, the most obvious economic benefits out of the ACFTA include 
increased bilateral trade, expanded GDP25, greater economic efficiency, lower costs, 
and increased investment, which may lead to the better research and development and 
                  
24 Furthermore, China agreed to extend concessions on 130 specific manufactured goods (Annex 2, FA) 
to countries that felt they had not benefited as much from the EHP. Singapore and Brunei were 
allowed to enjoy these concessions not only from China but from Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia 
as well. 
25 A group of specialists have conducted empirical calculations on economic effects of ASEAN-China 
Free Trade Area (ACFTA), if tariffs are reduced to zero by both sides, ACFTA would expand exports 
by USD13 bil. per year (48%) from ASEAN-6 to China and USD 10.6 bil. (55.1%) from China to 
ASEAN-6, while GDP would grow by o.86% in the ASEAN-6 and 0.27% in China. 
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then technological innovation. The most salient economic challenges out of the 
ACFTA are: intensified competition in domestic markets, possible trade diversion due 
to a shift from lower-cost non-member states to higher-cost member states, possible 
loss of tariff revenues, and temporary or short-run unemployment problems. 
III.3 THE CASE OF VIETNAM-UNITED STATES BTA: 
Following the victory of communist North Vietnam over U.S.-backed South 
Vietnam in 1975, the United States ended virtually all economic interchange with 
unified Vietnam. Washington and Hanoi gradually began to normalize relations in the 
early 1990s26. On July 13, 2000, after nearly five years of negotiation, Vietnam and 
the U.S. announced the signature of the bilateral trade agreement. Following 
affirmative votes in the Vietnamese National Assembly and the U.S. Congress, the 
VN-US BTA entered in into force on December 10, 2001, when the two countries 
formally exchanged letters implementing the agreement. 
The BTA is a major step toward fully normalizing VN-US economic relations, 
as it restores reciprocal most-favored-nation (replaced as normal trade relations 
[NTR] since 1998) treatment between the two countries, and commits Vietnam to 
undertake a wide range of market-oriented economic reforms. For both Vietnam and 
the United States, the BTA is the most comprehensive bilateral trade agreement ever 
negotiated by the two. In fact, the BTA is a modern “trade and” agreement, which 
includes not only extensive obligations related not just to import tariffs and quota, but 
also to transparency, dispute settlement, investment, intellectual property right 
protection, market access for services, and business facilitation (Box III.2). 
                  
26 In 1994, President Clinton ordered the lifting of the trade embargo against Vietnam. The following 
year, the two countries established ambassadorial-level diplomatic relations. In 1998, President 
Clinton granted Vietnam its first waiver from the requirements of the so-called Jackson-Vanik 
amendment contained in the Trade Act of 1974, Title IV, section 402. 
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Under the VN-US BTA, the U.S. will extend temporary most-favored nation 
(MFN) status to Vietnam, a step that will significantly reduce U.S. tariffs on most 
imports from Vietnam, as U.S. tariff rates on Vietnamese exports will fall from their 
non-MFN average of 40% to less than 3%. In return, Vietnam agreed to undertake a 
wide range of market-liberalization measures, including extending MFN treatment to 
U.S. exports, reducing tariffs on goods, easing barriers to U.S. services (such as 
banking and telecommunications), committing to protect certain intellectual property 
Box III.2: Five major area of the VN-US BTA commitments 
(1)   Market Access for Industrial and Agricultural Goods. Vietnam agrees to allow 
all Vietnamese firms, and over time U.S. persons and firms, the right to import and export 
freely from within its borders for the first time. It has agreed to sharply lower tariffs on 
the full range of U.S. industrial and agricultural exports, phase out all non-tariff 
measures, and to adhere to the WTO standards in applying customs, import licensing, 
state trading, technical standards and sanitary and phytosanitary measures.  
(2)  Intellectual Property Rights: Vietnam has pledged to phase in the World Trade 
Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) over 18 
months. The bilateral TRIPs agreement goes above and beyond the WTO’s TRIPs 
agreement by including Vietnamese commitments to protect satellite signals within 30 
months. 
(3)  Market Access for Services: Vietnam has committed to uphold WTO rules such 
as MFN, national treatment, and disciplines on domestic regulation. Vietnam allows U.S. 
persons and firms to enter its services market in a wide range of service sectors, including 
accounting, advertising, banking, computer, distribution, education, insurance, legal and 
telecommunications. These commitments are phased-in over time, typically within three 
to five years. 
(4) Investment Provision: the BTA includes guarantees of MFN treatment, national 
treatment, transparency, and protection against expropriation. Vietnam has pleadged to 
eliminate local content and export performance requirements and phase out its investment 
licensing regime for many sectors. Vietnam has agreed to eliminate within five years all 
TRIMs that are inconsistent with the WTO, such as local content requirements. 
(5) Transparency Provisions: Vietnam has agreed to adopt a fully transparent 
regime with respect to each of the four substantive areas above, by issuing draft laws, 
regulations and other rules for comment, ensuring that advance public notice is given for 
all such laws and regulations, that these documents are published and available, and by 
allowing U.S. citizens the right to appeal rulings made with respect to all such relevant 
laws and regulations.  
Source: http://vietnam.usembassy.gov.
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rights, and providing additional inducements and protections for inward foreign direct 
investment.  
In reality, the BTA requires that Vietnam cut tariffs, typically by 25-50 percent, 
on only around 250 tariff lines (out of more than 6,000 total tariff lines then), mostly 
in agricultural products. For quantitative restriction requirements, almost all of theses 
have been eliminated, those “bound” only for temporary duration, well ahead of BTA 
schedule as part of a IMF/WB agreement with the Government of Vietnam (CIEM-
STAR, 2003).  
The BTA after almost three years of enforcement has been a successful story, in 
terms of expanding trade, improving investment and business climate, and lock-in 
effect for domestic reforms, in Vietnam‘s international economic integration27. Within 
two years of 2003-2003, the bilateral trade value between Vietnam and the United 
States, with huge trade surplus for Vietnam, has reached 5.1 bil. USD, increased four 
times compared with just over 1.0 bil of 2001. In 2003, the United States replaced 
Japan, becomes the number one trading partner of Vietnam28. Vietnam’s expanded 
exports to the U.S. are much greater than the US’s exports to Vietnam because the 
BTA provides a much greater reduction in trade barriers to Vietnamese products on 
the U.S. market than for that to U.S. ones in the Vietnamese market, though 
significant liberalization has been made for U.S. service providers and investors.   
From sectoral perspective, manufactured goods have gained much more than 
primary commodities. Clothing export is the early winner of the BTA with export 
revenue to U.S. market increased almost 17 times in just a year, from USD 48 mil. in 
                  
27 For a comprehensive assessment of economic impacts of the BTA on Vietnamese economy, please 
see CIEM-STAR (2003): “An Assessment of the Economic Impacts of the US-VN Bilateral Trade 
Agreement- Annual Economic Report of 2002”, National Political Publisher, Hanoi. 
28 CIEM (2004): “ Vietnam Economy in 2003”, National Political Publisher, Hanoi., pg. 37. 
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2001 to over USD 900 mil. in 200229. In 2002 and 2003, Vietnam’s exports of 
furniture, travel goods and footwear and other manufactured products to the U.S. have 
grown strongly (Table III.2).   
Table III.2: Vietnam Exports to the U.S in 2002 & 2003 by Commodity Category 
 2002 (USD `000)
2002 
growth 
rate (%)
2003 
(USD `000) 
2003 
growth 
rate (%)
VN’s exports to US 2,394,745 128 4,554,860 90
  
Primary products 994,286 21 1,274,979 28
Fish & seafood 616,028 29 732,135 19
Vegetables & fruit 76,000 54 106,001 39
Coffee 53,016 -30 76,301 44
Crude rubber 11,232 300 13,282 18
Petroleum 181,125 -1 277,565 53
Other primary 56,840 92 69,695 23
Manufactures 1,400,416 502 3,290,930 135
Non-metallic mineral products 19,590 115 27,939 43
Metal manufactures 8,381 137 15,559 86
Electrical appliances 4,950 270 4,141 -16
Furnitures 80,441 499 187,774 133
Travel goods 49,535 5,422 85,955 74
Clothing 900,473 1,769 2,380,249 164
Footwear 224,824 70 327,300 46
Misc. manufactures 28,238 847 48,541 72
Other goods 84,029 297 213,472 154
Non-clothing manufactures 499,988 162 910,681 82
Non-clothing & footwear 
manufactures 275,164 424 583,381 112
Source: CIEM-STAR (forthcoming): “Update on 2003 Bilateral Trade between the 
United States and Vietnam”, Hanoi, 2004. 
The BTA has created positive and progressive effects on the legal system of 
Vietnam, as effective implementation of the BTA presumes a legal framework and 
                  
29 This is why the U.S has applied textile import quota on Vietnamese products since May 01st  2003.   
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judicial system that can resolve commercial disputes (e.g. the catfish anti-dumping 
case) in line with international standards, similar to those prescribed by the WTO 
(CIEM-STAR, 2003). Vietnam has also made a series of legal changes and 
enforcement to meet the BTA obligations30. Though with more standards and higher 
demands for trade liberalization commitments compared with theses for developing 
countries in the past, the overall effect of the BTA is to encourage efficient resource 
allocation and prepare Vietnam for accession to the WTO.  
III.4. ACCESSION TO THE WTO: 
Vietnam applied for membership in the  WTO in 1995. In August 1996, 
Vietnam submitted its Memorandum on Trade Regime to the WTO Working Party 
(WP) on accession of Vietnam. As of June 01st 2004, the WP has conducted seven 
sessions with Vietnamese negotiation delegation. The first four WP sessions focused 
on transparency of Vietnam’s trade policy and regime. The fifth WP session, held in 
January 2002, reviewed the status of Vietnam’s bilateral access negotiations and 
action plans for implementation of  a number of WTO agreements, including those 
related to investments and intellectual property rights. The sixth WP session, held in 
December 2002, marked the beginning of negotiations. At the seventh WP session, 
held in December 2003, the WP started work on key “elements” of the Draft Working 
Report on Vietnam accession. Vietnam has completed its transparency period and 
now in the process of substantive market accession negotiations with member of the 
WP. Up to now,  Vietnam has concluded bilateral negotiations with ten WP members 
and the eighth WG session is to be held in June 07th 2004 in Geneva. 
                  
30  For example, the new Customs Law, the amended Civil Code, the Civil Procedure Code, the 
amended Law on Credit Institutions, the new Law on Construction, and several sectoral Ordinances.  
 72
On commitments, Vietnam initially offered an average import tariff rate of 22 
percent, which is considered as too high compared with the WTO average of 10% for 
manufactured goods. At the coming eighth WP session in June 2004, Vietnam plans 
to offer the average tariff rate of 15.5 percent31, which is closed to that of China when 
acceding WTO. On services, Vietnam made its initial offer on specific commitments 
in services in January 2002. The WP members require “BTA parity” starting point 
when negotiating with Vietnam, and Vietnam has done more than that. Our of 11 
sector with 155 sub-sectors in WTO/GATS framework, Vietnam has made specific 
commitments to 10 sectors32 with 92 sub-sectors, compared with 8 sectors with 65 
sub-sectors in the VN-US BTA. 
Vietnam has also committed not to apply transitional period for obligations once 
becoming a WTO member. On subsidy issues, Vietnam will drop industrial subsidies 
when annual per capital income reach USD 1,000 and subsidize for agricultural sector 
up to 10% of the sector’s total output. Vietnam also commits not to apply quotas to 
agricultural imports and shift to tariffication. Regarding trading rights, Vietnam has 
committed to eliminate export ratio requirements, sectoral licensing, and quit the two-
price systems in some sectors such as air travel and electricity by 2005.   
The Government of Vietnam considers the accession to the WTO is top priority 
and a pivotal step in making the Vietnamese economy an integral part of a rule-based 
multilateral trading system. The WTO membership is significant for Vietnam to trade 
and gain access to world markets in equal terms, as by setting accepted rules among 
members WTO discriminated against non-member countries. WTO accession can 
generate considerable benefits in terms of improved legal framework and enabling 
                  
31 The current average tariff rate of Vietnam within AFTA scheme is 7.3% compared with 12.8% at the 
time of join AFTA. For a latest and comprehensive study on the structure of tariffs and protection in 
Vietnam, please see Athukorala, Prema-Chandra (2004): “Trade Policy Reforms and the Structures 
of Protection in Vietnam”, ADB and Vietnam Ministry of Finance, Hanoi. 
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environment all of which result in substantial productivity gains and incremental 
capital inflows (Liqun, 2002).  
As a WTO member, Vietnam would also be in better position to defend its 
interest on the international scene. Lacking other instruments, importing countries 
tend to intensify the use of sanitary standards, of allegations of price dumping, to 
protect the interests of their domestic producers. Vietnam’s exports of shrimps and 
gas lighters to the EU, of frozen fish fillets to the US (the catfish case), and garlic and 
water-proof footwear to Canada, have already suffered from trade barriers of this sort. 
Because Vietnam is not yet a WTO member, hence can not take advantage of its 
dispute settlement mechanism. In addition, dispute resolution is very costly and 
require technical expertise which is not readily available now in Vietnam (VDR 2003). 
Therefore, the Government of Vietnam has determined to gain WTO membership in 
2005, as the cost of WTO accession would be higher and harder to afford33 over time.  
III.5. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENTS: 
The Government of Vietnam is taking an active and constructive approach 
toward trade liberalization, whether on multilateral, regional or bilateral basis. 
Together with steadily pursuing AFTA commitments with the 2006 deadline and 
enforcement of the VN-US BTA since December 2001, the top priority now is for 
joining the WTO in 2005.  
As a trading partner, Vietnam enjoys favorable and comparative advantages in 
such primary industries as agricultural and fishing ones. Vietnam also have 
                                                   
32 Vietnam has not yet made commitments to environment service sector. 
33 The demands on new members will be higher than those current members had to meet when they 
joined in. Furthermore, the Doha Development Round is likely to raise the entry point. It would be, 
therefore, better for Vietnam to accede WTO before the conclusion of the DDA, which is scheduled 
for January 01st 2005. 
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competitive advantages in labor-intensive industries such as footwear, textiles and 
apparels with relatively low labor costs. However, with poor industrial base of low-
tech machinery and equipment and led by inefficient state-owned enterprises, the 
Vietnamese industrial sectors will suffer from increasingly inflows of competitive 
industrial products from the region. This in turn will have negative effects on 
employment and income of the labors; therefore, a social protection program or safety 
net should be in place to curtain liberalization demerits. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR VIETNAM: 
There are always possible static and dynamic economic gains from various 
types of PTAs. The net welfare effect for PTA members depends on whether trade 
creation or trade diversion is prevailing. Deeper integration is preferred, as welfare 
improvement is more certain. 
There is wide agreement that FTAs help to expand GDP and trade, attract 
investment, and seed up domestic structural reform, among other, but those effects 
vary from country to country and also between public sector and business one. For 
developing countries, there are possible economic gains, particularly from dynamic 
effects such as economies of scale, competition, and learning and technology spillover. 
However, challenges might come from sequencing bargaining effect, fiscal revenue 
transfer effect..etc.  
Although welfare consequences of PTA liberalization tend to be positive, it is 
generally acknowledged that PTA liberalization does not compare favorably with 
multilateral liberalization if gains from trade alone are considered. However, PTAs as 
feasible second-best means of trade liberalization. 
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PTAs as building blocks or stumbling blocks: PTAs can contribute to social 
welfare by generating trade creation effect and by acting as a stepping-stone towards 
further liberalized multilateral trading system. However, overlapping regional 
integration arrangements might cause negative effects such as trade diversion, 
“Spaghetti-Bowl” and “Hub-and-Spoke” effects.  
PTAs as new modalities and precedents for breakthroughs in multilateral 
negotiation for a: PTAs have a potential comparative advantage vis-a-vis multilateral 
arrangements as regulations can be written more tightly, creating opportunities for 
members to commit non-trade policy goals such as investment liberalization or 
political reform. 
Major East Asian countries have shifted towards bilateral and regional 
economic integration. In the short term, bilateral FTAs are prevailing, in the long term, 
an East Asian region-wide FTA is possible with breakthrough in Japan-China 
negotiations and relations. Countries such as Singapore, Thailand are very active in 
negotiating and concluding FTAs, seriously affect the integrity of ASEAN. For FTA 
partners, most countries in East Asian regions target United States and Japan as their 
first choices. The race to bilateral FTAs might turn ASEAN into a series of spokes 
rather than hubs, as ASEAN members are so divergent in development levels, 
resulting in different schedule of trade liberalization commitments to a common FTA 
partner of ASEAN, such as the case of ASEAN-China FTA.  
Possible welfare losses for Vietnam might occur due to trade, investment and 
production diversion, resulting from isolation, exclusion and discrimination in a third 
market which is member of certain FTAs or RTAs. Remember, nowadays, almost all 
WTO members are participating in at least one RTA. Losing competitiveness also 
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occur due to unequal access to world markets (higher tariff charges and non-tariff 
barriers). 
The FTA could make member countries worst off if the FTA diverts more trade 
than creates, and vice verse. When forming an FTA, we must consider which FTA is 
good for the country as a whole (net welfare gain) by looking at the whole impacts or 
entire economy and figure out what kinds of industrial restructuring would occur. In 
most cases, the structure of the FTA will determines the net welfare effects of such 
FTA.  
 Together with economic effects, there are always political and diplomatic 
effects such as the case of ASEAN-China FTA. Whether the balance of Vietnam’s 
national interests and relations with major powers is to be shifted by such ACFTA is 
too early to tell but it is the time for taking into consideration. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR VIETNAM: 
Renovation (Doi Moi) and open-door policy initiated since 1986 has 
significantly capitalized trade gains and development benefits for Vietnam. Though 
debatable on short-term adjustment costs of reducing trade barriers, trade openness is 
widely and empirically recognized as core for economic development. In Vietnam, 
international economic integration is considered as a cornerstone for economic growth 
and poverty reduction. In this context, a strategic thinking approach on preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs) in general and on free trade agreements (FTAs) in particular 
carries important implication for future economic growth and poverty reduction in 
Vietnam. Key Policy recommendations include: 
(1) Focusing on capacity building for FTA research and institutions: 
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Serious efforts and resources for coping with global trend of bilateralism and 
regionalism in trade liberalization. FTA feasible studies and negotiations require 
expertises and resources of which Vietnam is lacking. Positively, The Government of 
Vietnam just decided to establish the FTA Research Commission under the Ministry 
of Trade in March 2004.  
The Government should also encourage the establishment of non-profit 
economic and business research institutions. The experience of Japan and South 
Korea show that the business federations play a vital roles in initiating and proposing 
various FTA options to the Governments, whereas Vietnam is lacking of such private 
policy-oriented research initiatives and institutions. 
(2) In the short term, accelerating the WTO accession process is top priority, which 
require consistent political will:  
Speed up WTO accession would help gaining non-discrimination membership 
and MFN and NT status, so as to take advantage of GATT/WTO exceptions such as 
GATT Art. XXIV, Enabling clause and GATS Art. V etc. As a WTO member, Vietnam 
would also be in better position to defend its interest on the international scene, 
gaining equal access to the DSB mechanism. Moreover, the cost of WTO accession 
will increase over time.  
(3) Then priorities should be given to conducting serious studies on FTAs with the 
hubs and the “best-practice” makers:  
The hubs are those such as Singapore and Hong Kong, and the “best-practice” 
makers such as the United States and Japan. The aims are not only to prevent 
excluded status but also to help Vietnamese producers as well as export-oriented FIEs 
in Vietnam to maintain competitiveness in a third export market. To answer the 
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question of FTAs with whom, Vietnam should also preserve the first-mover 
advantages to the ones with best practices, i.e. most developed economies, which will 
help bring in best policy, business and management practices. Key determinants for 
choosing FTA partners include (1) The structure of comparative cum competitive 
advantage; (2) economic development level; (3) Geographical proximity; (4) Market 
size; and  (5) The existence of missing trade (Sohn, 2001) The studies should 
inclusive to various stakeholders such as academic, business, and governmental 
circles.  
(4) In the mid and long term, the (bilateral) FTA approach should be utilized as new 
policy options for post WTO accession.  
The FTA approach in East Asian economic integration is a reality; Vietnam 
should join the trend and do not go against the tide! Going bilateral and regional FTA 
approach as policy options for post WTO accession. Vietnam should utilize trade 
liberalization and economic integration at all three fronts, bilateral, regional and 
multilateral. However, as a developing country with relatively small market size and 
modest bargaining power, GATT/WTO multilateral framework as guidelines and 
foundation for designing any bilateral and regional FTAs.  
Vietnam’s approach to international economic integration has shifted from 
unilateral one in first period of 1986-1995 to multilateral one in 1995-2005. In the 
post WTO accession period to come, Vietnam should take a more balanced approach 
among multilateral, regional and bilateral ones. Liberalization and integration 
commitments within WTO-based multilateral framework are usually narrower and 
shallower than regional and sub-regional ones. Similarly, regional commitments are 
often narrower and shallower than bilateral or sectoral ones. Whereas unilateral 
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approach always provide Vietnam with more room for liberalization policy measures, 
as the Government is more self-determined in contents, scopes and schedules of 
liberalization commitments. That is why unilateral initiatives are considered as active, 
pre-emtive and deeper commitments. 
From theoretical as well as empirical perspectives, the North-South FTA 
modality is preferred, but South-South FTAs are also desirable for Vietnam as long as 
they expand foreign markets and boost domestic economic reforms. 
The uncompetitive sectors with comparative disadvantages might lose in further 
international integration process, the Government of Vietnam should design and put 
in place a safeguard or safety net for those would-be losers in potential FTAs by 
Vietnam. 
(5) Introducing a more balanced multi-track approach to international economic 
integration strategy for the post-WTO accession period: 
In the era of co-existence of multilateralism and regionalism, Vietnam should 
undertake a mixed approach of multilateralism, regionalism, and bilateralism with the 
aims of upgrading internal reforms and deepening external integration (Figure IV.1).    
 
Figure IV.1: Proposed Multi-Track Approach to International Integration in 
Post-WTO Accession Period. 
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For this end, Vietnam needs “early winners” to keep the process politically 
sustainable. Vietnam has to soon formulate a regional and bilateral trade strategy to 
response to new regionalism in East Asia. More importantly, Vietnam should design 
its own international economic integration strategy, for which the mixed or multi-
approach would serve as facilitating instrument. A pro-integration master-plan of 
active, unilateral, and strategic domestic reforms is precondition for any introduction 
of FTA approach into the international economic integration process of Vietnam.   
shallow 
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